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This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines the cost efficiency 
and production technology in the banking sector of Thailand using a stochastic frontier 
approach. The empirical results indicate that banks with lower Non-performing-loan-
to-total-loan ratio, higher equity-to-total-asset ratio, higher liquid-asset-to-total-asset 
ratio, and more branches are likely to be more efficient. The second essay investigates 
the degree of competition in the banking industry using the new empirical industrial 
organization approach. The empirical results indicate that, despite the Thailand 
government’s efforts to increase competition in the banking industry by relaxing 
restrictions on entry to the market after the financial crisis, the oligopolistic degree of 
the biggest four banks has intensified.  The third essay links the results of the first and 
second essays, cost efficiency and competition in the banking sector, to the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Thailand using Vector Autoregression 
approach. The empirical results indicate that an unexpected tightening monetary 
policy shock leads to higher financial costs in the banking industry, forcing banks to 
compete more fiercely and operate more efficiently, significantly helping strengthen 
the transmission of monetary policy. Hence, the policy implication is that Thai 
government should exert more effort to enhance efficiency and competition in the 
banking sector. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
The banking sector of Thailand underwent a financial meltdown during the 
East Asian financial crisis of 1997. Since that crisis, banks in Thailand have been 
subject to financial restructuring directed by the IMF and subsequent liberalization 
introduced by the Thai government to enhance efficiency and competition within the 
industry. 
The banking sector has recovered and is significantly reformed and continues 
to play important roles in the Thai economy. Banks are not only the major sources of 
funding for consumption and investment, but also serve as instruments in facilitating 
the transmission of monetary policy. Hence, it is useful to study how efficiently banks 
operate, how intensely they compete with each other, and ultimately how their 
efficiency and competition affect monetary policy transmission. This chapter 
summarizes the content of the dissertation, consisting of three essays, and discusses 
those questions that will be examined and answered in each chapter. 
The next chapter, or the first essay, examines banks’ efficiency and banks’ 
characteristics that determine efficiency. I estimate a stochastic cost frontier function, 
which enables me to extract not only individual bank cost efficiency but also 
information about underlying production technology such as economies of scale, 
factor demand elasticities and technological change The results will allow me to 
answer the question of whether bank efficiency increased over this period and what 
where the causations of bank efficiency. 
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Chapter 3, or the second essay, examines the degree of competition in the 
banking industry by using the new empirical industrial organization approach (NEIO). 
The estimated conduct parameter will show to what extent banks are able to collude. 
Moreover, the model will show the direct linkage between market-concentration 
structure and markup pricing, enabling me to test the established belief that higher 
concentration leads to higher markups. The cross-sectional data also allows me to 
derive the Lerner index, which shows how the competition degree in banking sector 
evolved after the financial crisis. Ultimately, I will be able to answer the question of 
whether competition in the banking industry really improves after the crisis and the 
subsequent financial liberalization. 
Chapter 4, or the third essay, relates bank efficiency and competition to 
monetary policy transmission by estimating a vector autoregession (VAR) equation.  I 
incorporate the bank-efficiency index and the bank competition index into my VAR 
model. I find that when the central bank changes the 14-day repurchase rate, i.e. policy 
interest rate, this effect is transmitted to the real sector through an adjustment to 
banks’ financial cost and lending interest rate, which is affected by banks’ efficiency 
and competition. Using the impulse response functions, I show how aggregate output 
and commodity price dynamically response to an unexpected increase in the policy 
rate. In addition, the importance of banks’ efficiency and competition can be gauged 
by comparing between the impact of monetary policy shock on output and price 
(speed and size) when the roles of banks’ efficiency and competition are blocked off 
i.e. when they are treated as exogenous variables, and these are allowed to operate i.e. 
when they are treated as endogenous variables. 
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In the last chapter, I will summarize the answers to the questions proposed 
earlier: “How efficient are banks?” “How did the degree of competition in banking 
sector evolve after the crisis?” and “How does bank efficiency and competition affect 
monetary policy transmission?” and, last but not least, “What are the policy 
implications to strengthen banking performance in the Thai economic and make 
monetary policy transmission more effective?” 
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Chapter 2 
 
Efficiency Analysis of Thai Banks 
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Abstract 
 
Using a stochastic cost frontier approach, I estimate cost inefficiency, return to scale, 
factor demand elasticities, and productivity growth of commercial banks and 
government-owned specialized banks in Thailand after the 1997 East Asian Financial 
crisis. For commercial banks, Krung Thai Bank and the other three biggest banks are 
the most efficient banks while the smallest four banks are ranked at the bottom. Cost 
inefficiency of banks is significantly determined by banks’ financial characteristics 
such as the ratio of non-performing loan to total loan, equity to total assets, and 
liquidity assets to total assets, as well as the number of branches. The results also 
indicate that commercial banks exhibit increasing return to scale whereas government-
owned specialized banks suffer from decreasing return to scale. In commercial banks, 
labor and loanable funds appear to be substitutes; however, labor and physical capital 
as well as physical capital and loanable funds are complementary. In contrast, in 
government specialized banks’ the production of loan and investment, all three inputs 
including labor, physical capital and loanable funds appear to be substitutes for each 
other. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Thailand’s financial sector mainly comprises three parts: the banking sector, 
government-owned specialized financial institutions, and non-bank financial 
intermediaries including finance companies, credit foncier companies1, life insurance 
companies and various financial co-operatives. Commercial banks are the largest 
component of the Thailand financial sector. As of December 2010, there were 19 
domestically owned commercial banks with 4,249 branches. There were 15 foreign banks 
which each was allowed to open only one branch in Thailand. Finance companies are 
not permitted to accept deposits; they raise funds by issuing debt instruments and their 
business concentrates on short-term consumer lending. Government-owned 
specialized financial institutions include the Government Saving Bank, the 
Government Housing Bank, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, 
the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Bank of Thailand, the Export-Import 
Bank of Thailand, and the Islamic Bank of Thailand. Some of them are not allowed to 
accept deposits and they extend loans only to particular types of customers. For non-
bank financial intermediaries, average size and aggregated share in the financial sector 
are very small. 
Dating back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, and prior to the East Asian 
economic crisis, financial market deregulation was introduced by the Thai 
government. The financial liberalization program was composed of three components: 
dismantling of interest rate controls, relaxing portfolio restrictions, and expanding the 
                                                 
1 Credit foncier company is a kind of financial institutions in Thailand whose businesses concentrate on 
mortgage loans. The term “foncier” derives from French, meaning “of the land”. 
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scope of activities of finance companies and commercial banks. The ultimate goal of 
liberalization was to enhance efficiency of the financial sector. Consequently, the 
country attracted enormous capital inflows and achieved a rapid economic growth rate 
during this period ranging from 8% to 12%. This achievement was widely acclaimed 
by the IMF and the World Bank, and was known as part of the "Asian economic 
miracle". 
However, fueled by the surge of short-term capital inflows, Thailand’s 
economy developed into a bubble. Later, the country as well as other countries in East 
Asia experienced an economic crisis in 1997. Not only did the real sector of Thailand 
but also the financial sector severely suffered from the crisis. The growth rate of GDP 
was only 1.8% in 1997 and then further deteriorated to a negative 10.4%, in 1998. 
Foreign exchange reserves went down sharply from 26.6 billion dollar on February 13, 
1997 to only 2.8 billion dollar on June 30, 1997. As a consequence, the Thai 
government decided to float the Thai baht. As a result, the currency depreciated 
83.27% from 25.78 baht per dollar in June 1997 to 47.25 baths per dollar in December 
1997. Simultaneously, the foreign debt in term of Thai baht doubled to 4.34 trillion. 
Because of loss confidence in the baht and excessive speculation in the foreign 
exchange market, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) implemented contraction monetary 
policy in order to protect the currency, thereby terribly increasing the 14-day 
repurchase rate to a peak of 22.22% by the end of 1997. This led to not only a dreadful 
increase in the financial cost to producers, many of whom became insolvent, but also 
led to the problem of Non Performing Loans (NPLs) of the financial institutions. The 
bank of Thailand reported that NPLs of the financial institutions as a whole in June 
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1998 was 47.7%, four times larger than it had been before the crisis. Eventually, 
several financial institutions went bankrupt, including 56 financial companies which 
were subsequently closed and liquidated. Inevitably, Thailand had to request financial 
support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF offered a rescue 
package of 20.3 billion dollar in total, subject to programs of economic stabilization 
and reform to be implemented from 1997 to 1999. One condition of the rescue plan 
was financial sector restructuring, initially focused on the identification and closure of 
unviable financial institutions, intervention in weak banks, and the recapitalization of 
the banking system. These activities certainly affected the efficiency of Thai banks. 
As a consequence of the reform directed by the IMF, there was significance 
change in the ownership structure of financial institutions. The government not only 
nationalized and liquidated a number of distressed banks, but also abolished the 
restriction on foreign ownership of commercial banks, which had been restricted to 
less than 25% of the equity capital, in order to attract foreign banks and investors to 
recapitalize the distressed banks. Before the crisis, founding families were the largest 
shareholders in 5 of the largest 8 banks; however, by 2003, foreign investors were the 
largest shareholders in two banks including the largest one. Two other banks have 
been either nationalized or liquidated, and there remains only one bank in which the 
founding family is the largest shareholder. A change in ownership structure might 
affect banks’ performance as well. 
After the IMF era, in January 2004, the Thai government announced the 
Financial Sector Master Plan. The substantial part of this plan addressed measures to 
increase efficiency of the financial sector by enhancing market mechanisms. These 
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included (i) relaxing entry to the banking sector by promoting upgrade of finance and 
credit foncier companies to commercial banks; (ii) relaxing regulations on opening 
branches in densely populated areas; (iii) relaxing restrictions on foreign financial 
institutions’ scope of business and number of branches. By 2006, 3 finance companies 
were upgraded to commercial-bank status by issuance of brand-new banking licenses. 
These entries would lead to an intensification of competition within the industry, 
thereby enhancing efficiency. 
Now, several years after the crisis, Thailand’s banks are fully recovered and 
reformed. They play important roles to lubricate and drive the Thai economy. In 2005, 
over 6 trillion baht (approximately 180 billions of USD) of total deposits or deposit 
equivalents is in the banking sector, accounting approximately for 76 percent of total 
deposits or deposits equivalent in all of Thailand’s financial institutions. This amount 
is roughly 88 percent of GDP in 2005. Moreover, as the most crucial source of credit, 
the banks provide lending of approximately 5.5 trillion baht, accounting roughly for 
77 percent of total credit provided by all of Thailand’s financial institutions.  
Because of the importance of banks to the government, households and 
investors, the efficiency of banks is a major concern. Several changes, especially in 
ownership structure and competition environment, have occurred in the Thai banking 
sector. Hence, it is useful and important to investigate what factors determine banks’ 
efficiency and how their efficiency evolves over time. These objectives can be 
achieved by implementing a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate banks’ 
efficiency, and modeling determinant of efficiency by regressing efficiency on 
variables of interested. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows; Section 2.2 provides a brief 
literature review especially focused on financial institutions, Section 2.3 concentrates 
on a description of methodology, empirical specification and data, Sections 2.4 and 2.5 
provide results and conclusions, respectively. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
As defined by Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998), efficiency of a firm consists of 2 
major components: (1) technical efficiency, referring to the ability of a firm to produce 
maximal output from a given set of inputs (or alternatively, minimizing the inputs 
necessary to produce given set of outputs), and (2) allocative efficiency, referring to 
the ability of a firm to use  inputs and produce outputs in optimal proportions given 
their respective prices and production technology. These two measures can be 
combined to provide a measure of total economic efficiency. At its heart, the primary 
goal of measuring efficiency is to separate those production units that perform well 
from those that perform poorly by some standards. 
Measuring bank efficiency has become an established field of frontier analysis. 
These studies have developed a relatively standardized methodology and conceptual 
framework. Research on bank efficiency developed in two separated streams: 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). The first, 
sometimes referred to as the econometric frontier approach, specifies a functional form 
for the cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs, outputs, and 
environmental factors, and allows for random error whose distribution is usually 
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assumed to follow such symmetric distribution as the standard normal, whereas 
inefficiencies are assumed to be distributed asymmetrically as half-normal or truncated 
normal. On the other hand, DEA is a non-parametric approach which employs a linear 
programming technique where the set of frontier observations is formed as a piecewise 
linear combination of the actual input–output correspondence set that envelops the 
data of all the firms in the sample, yielding a convex production possibilities set. As 
such, DEA, unlike SFA, does not require an explicit specification of the functional 
form of the underlying production relationship. However, a key drawback to the 
nonparametric approach is the unrealistic assumption that there is no random error; in 
other words, it is assumed that there is no measurement error in constructing the 
frontier, and further that performance neither depends on good luck nor bad luck. In 
addition, Simar and Wilson (2007) argued that the conventional statistical inference, 
relying on the two-stage approach that employs the non-parametric distance function 
to estimate the technical efficiency in the first stage and then regressing the efficiency 
on exogenous factors using Tobit or censored regression in the second stage, are 
invalid due to complicated unknown serial correlation among the estimated 
efficiencies; they proposed double bootstrap procedures that permit valid inference 
and improves statistical efficiency in the second-stage regression. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) have surveyed the results of 130 studies of 
financial institution efficiency covering 21 countries that apply both parametric and 
non-parametric methods and found that their efficiency estimates are very similar, but 
the nonparametric methods generally yield slightly lower mean efficiency estimates 
and seem to have greater dispersion than the results of the parametric models. 
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Nonetheless, these days, there is really no consensus among researchers on the 
preferred method for determining the frontier against which relative efficiencies are 
measured, even though the parametric estimation has seemed to be more prevalent in 
recent years (see for example, Fuentes et al., 2001; Cuesta and Orea, 2002).  
Due to the limitation of imposing a particular functional form necessary for the 
SFA approach, researchers have been searching for appropriate flexible functional 
forms. Initially, the Cobb-Douglas form was commonly used because of its attractive 
simplicity of linear in logarithms of inputs, constant input elasticities and 
homotheticity. Later, the translog form, the most popular alternative form, replaced 
the Cobb-Douglas. Unlike the Cobb-Douglas, the translog form imposes no 
restrictions upon substitution possibilities and need not be homothetic. Gallant (1981) 
and Berger et al. (1994) argue that the translog as a local approximation provides poor 
approximations for such data that are not near the mean scale and product mix as 
financial institutions’ data typically are located. Besides, the translog forces the 
frontier average cost curve to have a symmetric U-shape in logs (in the case of the cost 
frontier). Fortunately, more flexible functional forms have been introduced. Several 
empirical studies in bank efficiency have specified a Fourier-flexible functional form 
which provides global approximations by adding Fourier trigonometric terms to a 
standard translog function. This greatly increases the flexibility of the frontier by 
allowing for many inflection points and by including essentially orthogonal 
trigonometric terms that help fit the frontier to the data wherever most needed. 
With regard to modeling inefficiency, many studies on the determinants of 
inefficiency use a two-stage approach. First, efficiency scores are estimated by using 
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the SFA. In the second step, because of the acknowledgement that the estimated 
inefficiency must lie between zero and one, the statistical interrelationship between 
efficiency and its potential determinants is analyzed by using either logit, tobit, or 
other truncated regression models. Nevertheless, this approach is inconsistent with the 
assumption about distribution of inefficiency. Indeed, the specification of the 
regression of the second stage conflicts with the assumption that inefficiency is 
independently and identically distributed. Alternatively, the method of Battese and 
Coelli (1995) estimates the impact of inefficiency determinants jointly with the 
efficiency frontier itself by using an iterative maximum likelihood procedure. Each 
observation of the sample is assigned an inefficiency estimate that partly depends on 
these determinants. In recent years, the one-stage method has been preferred to the 
two-stage method in bank efficiency literature. 
In terms of applications, research on bank efficiency has largely focused on 
using institution efficiency estimates: (1) to inform government policy (e.g., by 
assessing the effects of deregulation, mergers, and market structure on industry 
efficiency); (2) to address research issues (e.g., by determining how efficiency varies 
with different frontier approaches, output definitions, and time periods); and (3) to 
improve managerial performance (e.g., by identifying best-practice and worst-practice 
branches within a single firm). Among these three justifications for estimating bank 
efficiency, the first one appears to be most popular. The policy implications can be 
found by modeling inefficiency in terms of explanatory variables representing 
deregulation, risks, problem loans, management quality, market structure, and merger, 
for example. 
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In econometric estimation, it is commonly acknowledged that the choice of 
variables affects the results. The problem is compounded by the fact that variable 
selection is often constrained by availability of data on relevant variables. The cost and 
output measurements in banking are especially difficult because many of the financial 
services are jointly produced and prices are typically assigned to a bundle of financial 
services. The role of banks is generally defined as collecting the savings of households 
and other agents to finance the investment needs of firms and consumption needs of 
individuals. Generally, according to Das and Ghosh (2006), three major alternative 
approaches are employed to categorize inputs and outputs in the studies in bank 
efficiency: (1) intermediation approach, (2) value-added approach and (3) operating 
approach. Under the intermediation approach, financial institutions are viewed as 
intermediating funds between savers and investors. Deposits, labor (employee 
expenses) and capital (defined as operating and administrative expenses related to 
fixed assets) are assumed as inputs for producing loans and investments. There is, 
however, a longstanding controversy whether deposits should be treated as an input or 
output. This led to the establishment of the value-added approach, which can be 
viewed as a variant of the intermediation approach. Under the value-added approach, 
labor (employee expenses) and capital (operating and administrative expenses related 
to fixed assets) are used as inputs producing outputs like deposits, loans and 
investments. In general, under this approach, the major categories of produced 
deposits (e.g., demand, term and saving deposits) and loans (e.g., mortgages and 
commercial loans) are viewed as outputs because they are responsible for the 
significant proportion of value added. Finally, under the operating approach, three 
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different types of inputs are considered: interest expenses, employee expenses and 
other operating expenses excluding employee expenses. The relevant outputs are 
interest-related revenues and non-interest revenues emanating mostly from 
commission, exchange, brokerage, etc.  
Selected inputs and outputs under various alternative approaches as employed 
in the study are summarized in Table 2.1. In previous studies, the intermediation 
appeared to be widely employed. This approach may be more appropriate for 
evaluating entire financial institutions because it is inclusive of interest expenses, 
which often accounts for one-half to two-thirds of total costs of general financial 
institutions.  
 
Table 2.1: Inputs and Outputs Commonly Used in the Three Different Approaches. 
Approaches Inputs Outputs 
Intermediate 1. Labor 
2. Physical capital 
3. Deposits 
1. Loans 
2. Investments 
Value-added 1. Labor 
2. Physical capital 
1. Deposits 
2. Loans 
3. Investments 
Operating 1. Labor 
2. Physical capital 
3. Deposits 
1. Interest revenues 
2. Non-interest revenues 
 
Although bank efficiency studies have long been established in the USA and 
Europe, efficiency studies based on the Thailand banking system are limited and most 
have concentrated on commercial banks. Among the earliest studies, Leightner and 
Lovell (1998) employed the production frontier and Malmquist index to analyze the 
impact of financial liberalization on the performance of Thai banks for 1989-1994; 
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they reported that the average bank in Thailand experienced relatively rapid growth in 
production and total factor productivity. 
Subsequently, Kwan (2003) examined the banking industries’ per unit 
operating costs in seven Asian economies including Thailand from 1992 to 1999. 
Based on commercial banks, the study showed that the country ranking of per unit 
labor costs and the country ranking of per unit physical capital costs were highly 
related; however, bank operating efficiency seemed to be unrelated to the degree of 
openness of the banking sector. The author also reported that on average banks 
improved their operating performance from1992 to 1997. 
Thereafter, Chansarn (2005) investigate the efficiency in the Thai financial 
sector after the financial crisis by looking at the total factor productivity (TFP) growth. 
Based on a sample of 12 commercial banks, 13 finance and securities companies and 
20 insurance companies, the finding reveals that the efficiency in commercial bank 
sector as well as finance and securities company sector diminished over the period. 
Chantapong and Menkhoff (2005) studied the effect of foreign bank entry on 
banking efficiency in Thailand after the financial crisis in 1997 by using the 
conventional translog cost frontier; The results showed that the cost efficiency of 
domestic banks improved, resulting from an increase in competition arising from the 
foreign bank entry through acquisition since 1999. 
Rangkakulnuwat (2007) utilized an output distance function approach to 
estimate the technical efficiency of seven Thai commercial banks surviving the 1997 
crisis, from 1980 to 2005. Assumptions of time-invariant and time-variant technology 
are applied to three models: fixed effect, random effect, and ML.  In each model, the 
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variations in efficiency across banks are low. In addition, correlations of estimates 
across all three methods are always at least 0.5. The determinants of Thai commercial 
banks efficiency are investigated in this study using the second-step Tobit regression 
model. The author found that the financial liberalization plan between 1987 and 1997 
as well as the economics and financial reform programs financially supported by IMF, 
improve efficiency of Thai commercial banks.  
In addition, Chansarn (2008) utilized a DEA approach to examine the relative 
efficiency of Thai commercial banks during 2003 – 2006. The findings revealed that 
the efficiency of Thai commercial banks via the operation approach is very high and 
stable while the efficiency via the intermediation approach was moderately high and 
somewhat volatile. In term of size - large, medium and small banks, on average, were 
efficient via the operation approach with average efficiencies of 100%. However, 
small banks were the most efficient banks via intermediation approach. 
Recently, Thoraneenitiyan and Avkiran (2009) employed an approach 
integrating DEA and SFA to measure the impact of restructuring and country-specific 
factors on bank efficiency in East Asian including Thailand from 1997 to 2001. The 
results indicated that although domestic mergers produced more efficient banks, 
overall, restructuring did not lead to a more efficient banking system. Banking system 
inefficiencies were mostly attributed to country-specific conditions, particularly, high 
interest rates, concentrated markets and economic development. 
As mentioned previously in Section 2.1, Thai banks can be classified into one 
of three groups; commercial banks, government-owned specialized banks and foreign 
banks. Among these three groups, the commercial banks have been extensively 
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studied in previous papers. Few studies incorporate the last two groups in spite of the 
fact that they compete with commercial banks in the loan business to a certain degree. 
Because they are different in terms of business structures, management styles and 
customer bases, one may argue that they operate under different production 
technology or different environment. In previous literature, there were two methods to 
address efficiency comparison across production units under different technology or 
different environment. Firstly, some authors separately estimated the best-practice 
frontiers for each kind of firms from which the average level of efficiency for each 
group was calculated and compared. This method can show only that firms in one 
group are more or less efficient than firms in another group, relative to their specific 
frontier technology. Put simply, it only implies that firms in a group with high average 
efficiency operate closer to their specific frontier than firms in a group with low 
average efficiency. Yet, it does not indicate that firms in one group are more efficient 
than firms in the other group to the same degree, because the two practices are situated 
on different technological frontiers. Secondly, in some papers, the authors took into 
account the effect of different technology and environment under which banks operate 
by including controls for bank types, country dummies, assets, liquidity, or a 
concentration ratio, for instance. These factors reflecting technology and 
environmental heterogeneity were allowed to influence either the cost frontier directly 
or to enter the model as inefficiency determinants. However, one must keep in mind 
that, first of all, some statistical tests are needed to evaluate suitability and significance 
of hypotheses that each firm’s data comes from the same population distribution. 
examples of studies using these methods are given below. 
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Havrylchyk (2006) applied the stochastic cost frontier to investigate the 
efficiency of the Polish banking industry, especially between domestic and foreign 
banks, from 1997 to 2001. The author performed a number of statistic tests, both 
parametric and non-parametric, to investigate whether domestic and foreign banks are 
members of the same population distribution. He used tests such as ANOVA, 
Wilcoxon Rank-sum and Kruskal–Wallis. Test results reveal that the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% significance level, thereby indicating that it would be inappropriate 
to pull all banks into one sample. Hence, the author constructed the best-practice 
frontiers for domestic and foreign banks separately. 
On the other hand, Dietsch and Vivas (2000) compared the cost efficiency of 
French and Spanish banking industries. The authors argued that the technology used in 
countries like France and Spain should be the same, but the environmental conditions 
faced by financial institutions were likely to differ substantially; therefore, they 
estimated a common cost frontier that included the specific environmental conditions 
of each country, such as the number of branches, density of demand, per capita income 
and degree of concentration. 
Similarly, Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux and Seth (2000) suggested that the cost 
characteristics and the risks associated with operation widely differed among Japanese 
banks, so these factors should be incorporated in the underlying industry cost 
functions. Otherwise, one might easily miscalculate a bank’s level of inefficiency. 
Hence, they controlled for output quality and risk factors by adding loan-loss 
provisions, liquidity ratio and adjusted values of the output for each bank to the cost 
frontier model. 
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Majid, Saal and Battisti (2010) analyzed the impact of Islamic banking on the 
cost efficiency of Malaysian commercial banks. Islamic banks operate under the 
Islamic legal code, so interest payments are prohibited in any transaction; therefore, 
their technology should be different from conventional banking. They specified a 
common cost frontier for both Islamic banks and commercial banks but allowed for 
controls for operating environment such as loan quality, equity-to-total assets ratio, 
merger dummy, and bank-type dummies. 
From the literature review, it is observed that past empirical studies on Thai 
banks’ efficiency have used both DEA and SFA methods. For the latter, researchers 
concentrated on using the conventional translog functional form in spite of availability 
of more flexible functional form. Furthermore, most focused on measuring efficiency 
of the commercial banks; only few studies have compared them with the foreign 
banks; none of them encompassed the government-owned specialized banks despite 
their competition with the commercial banks in the loan market and their important 
roles in the financial sector. This article is intended to fill these gaps in literature on 
Thai-bank efficiency. The first contribution of this article is to introduce the Fourier 
flexible functional form which is more flexible than the conventional translog form 
popularly used in the existing literature. The second is to compare the banking 
production costs between different bank types in Thailand: the commercial banks and 
the government-owned specialized banks. Finally, more recent years are added to a 
longitudinal data set allowing more efficient estimates. 
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2.3 Methodology and Data 
 
Methodology 
 
To evaluate the performance of Thai banks, I estimate a parametric cost 
frontier model. The cost function is used to measure efficiency instead of a production 
function because the former allows us to determine how cost efficient the bank is as a 
financial intermediary in channeling funds to borrowers. In this approach, those whose 
costs are higher than those predicted for an efficient bank producing the same 
input/output combination and the difference cannot be explained by statistical noise 
are labeled as inefficient banks. The cost frontier is obtained by estimating a cost 
function with a composite error term, the sum of a two-sided error representing 
random fluctuations in cost and a one-sided positive error term representing 
inefficiency. The stochastic cost frontier model can be written as 
  ,i i iTC TC Q P       (1) 
 
where TC  is observed total cost of production, iQ  is a vector of outputs, and iP  is an 
input-price vector. The error term is assume to be 
 i i iu v    
where iu  and iv  are independently distributed; iv  is assumed to be distributed as two-
sided normal with zero mean and variance, 2v , capturing the effects of the statistical 
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noise, and iu  is assumed to be distributed as half normal
2,  2, uu N     i.e., a 
positive disturbance capturing the effects of inefficiency when   is defined as 
 0i ji j
j
Z        (2) 
where jiZ  is the j
th inefficiency determinant of the bank ith. The cost frontier model, 
equation (1), and the inefficiency model, equation (2), are to be estimated 
simultaneously via a maximum likelihood procedure. 
The next step, given the choice of the half-normal inefficiency stochastic 
frontier approach, involves choosing the underlying cost function specification. I use 
the flexible Fourier (FF) form to examine the specification which best fits the 
underlying cost structure of Thailand banking systems. The FF functional form is the 
global approximation which can be shown to dominate the conventional translog 
form3. It has been widely accepted that the global property is important in banking 
where scale, product mix and other inefficiencies are often heterogeneous. Therefore, 
local approximations (such as those generated by the translog function) may be a 
relatively poor approximation to the underlying true cost function. 
The FF is a semi-nonparametric approach used to tackle the problem arising 
when the true functional form of the relationships is unknown. It has been shown by 
Tolstov (1962), that a linear combination of the sine and cosine function, namely the 
Fourier series, can fit exactly any well behaved multivariate function. This is due to 
the mathematical behavior of the sine and cosine functions which are mutually 
                                                 
2 According to Berger and Humphrey (1997) the half-normal assumption is relatively inflexible and 
presumes that most firms are clustered near full efficiency. 
3 Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore (2001) 
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orthogonal over the  0,2  interval and function space-spanning. The FF form, 
therefore, provides a better approximation of the true form of the unknown cost 
function without misspecification. 
To calculate the inefficiency measures, the FF form, including a standard 
translog and all first-, second- and third-order trigonometric terms, as well as a two-
component error structure is estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure. This is 
shown as 
lnTC  0 1ln lni i l l
i l
Q P t T       
  22
1 ln ln ln ln
2 ij i j lm l mi j l m
Q Q P P t T         
     ln ln cos sinim i m i i i i
i m i
Q P a y b y       
     cos sinij i j ij i j
i j
a y y b y y u v          (3) 
where iy  is the adjusted values of the log output, ln iQ , such that they span the 
interval  0,2 , T is a time trend, and u  is assumed to be distributed as half normal, 
 2, uu N    , capturing the effects of inefficiency. It is worth noting that the 
likelihood function is expressed in term of the variance parameters 2 2 2v u     and 
2 2
u v   . It is a measure of the amount of variation stemming from inefficiency 
relative to noise. Values of γ close to 0 indicate that the symmetric error vit dominates 
the one-sided error uit. 
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In addition, the data must be scaled because a Fourier series approximation 
near a point of discontinuity can oscillate wildly. To avoid this problem, according to 
Kauko (2009), for each observation, the output data were rescaled as follows: 
      1.8 min max min 0.1i i i i iy Q Q Q Q             (4) 
Following Berger et al. (1994), the study applies Fourier terms only to the 
outputs, leaving the input price effects to be defined entirely by the translog terms. The 
primary goal is to maintain the limited number of Fourier terms for describing the 
scale and inefficiency measures associated with differences in bank size. Moreover, 
the usual input price homogeneity restrictions can be imposed on logarithmic price 
terms, whereas they cannot be easily imposed on the trigonometric terms. 
Since the duality theorem requires that the cost function be linearly 
homogeneous in input prices and second-order parameters are symmetric, the 
following restrictions apply to the parameters of the cost function: 
 1l
l
  ;  0lm
l
  ; 0im
i
  ; ij ji  ; lm ml   
Within sample scale economies are calculated and evaluated at the mean 
output, input price and financial capital levels4. A measure of economies of scale (SE) 
is given by the following cost elasticity by differentiating the cost frontier, equation 
(3), with respect to output. This gives us 
ln ln ln
ln i ij j im mi i i j i mi
TCSE Q P
Q
          
                                                 
4 It is common to evaluate the elasticity at the geometric mean 
1
1
n n
i
i
a a

     . 
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         1.8 sin cosmax mini i i i ii i i
Q a y b y
Q Q
            
         3.6 sin cosmax mini ij i j ij i ji j i i
Q a y y b y y
Q Q
               
(5) 
The price responsiveness of inputs can be measured by estimating the price 
elasticity of demand (ηij). In our analysis the price elasticity of conditional demand 
was estimated using the following formula: 
   2
1ii i i
ii
i
S S
S
   ,  ij i jij
i j
S S
S S
     (6) 
and ii i iiS  , ij j ijS        (7) 
where σij is the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitutions and Si is cost share of 
input ith. Alternatively, another measure of ease of substitution known as Morishima 
elasticity of substitutions ( Mij ) can be defined as 
 Mij ij jj            (8) 
Note that the Morishima elasticity, unlike the Allen-Uzawa elasticity, is not 
symmetric. Morishima elasticity of substitution measures the percentage change in the 
ratio of a pair of factors with respect to a change in the ratio of their respective prices. 
Note also that for any two inputs i and j it may be that 0Mij   but that 0ij  , so that 
by the Morishima measure, the inputs are substitutes, but by the Allen measure, the 
inputs are complements. 
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According to Lang and Welzel (2006), the rate of technological progress can 
be inferred from changes in a bank’s cost function over time. A time trend variable, T, 
is incorporated into the cost function to capture the disembodied technological change 
allowing the bank to produce a given level of output, Q, at lower cost over time, 
holding input prices constant. This can be measured by taking partial derivatives of the 
estimated cost frontier with respect to the time trend variable (T) and can be shown as 
follows: 
 1 2
ln
c
TCT t t T
T
        (9) 
 
Data 
 
As mentioned above, the intermediation approach is chosen in this study. 
Under this approach, banks input are classified as deposits and acquired funds, labor 
and capital which are employed in the production of loans and investments. The panel 
data for 13 existing commercial banks and 5 government-owned banks excluding the 
Islamic banks are collected from their quarterly financial reports.  
Data for commercial banks start from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth 
quarter of 2009. However, dramatic changes in the commercial bank sector occurred 
during the periods included in the sample set. Specifically, after the crisis, several 
banks were unable to survive. As a result, they were forced to shut down, merged 
with, or acquired by others banks. Some banks recently emerged as the government 
decided to give licenses to financial companies to become new banks after 2001. The 
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story of post-crisis reorganization of the Thai commercial banks industry is 
summarized in the chart below. 
For the government-owned banks, 5 out of 6 banks are included. The Islamic 
bank is excluded from this study because it was newly established, so insufficient data 
are available. The remaining 5 government-owned specialized banks included in this 
study consist of Government Saving Bank (GSB), the Government Housing Bank 
(GHB), the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), the Small 
and Medium Enterprise Development Bank of Thailand (SME Bank), the Export-
Import Bank of Thailand (EXIM Bank). The panel data for these banks are unbalanced 
because they, unlike the commercial banks, need not publish their quarterly financial 
statements; they were forced by law to provide the ministry of finance with only their 
end-of-the-year balance sheets and income statements; recently, around 2003, the 
ministry of finance requested them to report their quarterly financial statements; 
however, their available data are still limited, leading to missing observations for some 
years. 
 
In order to estimate the cost frontier, the following variables are constructed: 
1. Total cost  TC  is composed of interest expense, non-interest expense on 
personnel and non-interest expense on premises and equipment. 
2. Loan  1Q consists of quantity of loan, inter-bank and money market items. 
3. Investment  2Q is comprised of government and state enterprise securities, 
and other securities. 
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4. Unit price of labor  1P  is obtained from non-interest expense on personnel 
divided by the number of employees5. 
5. Unit price of physical capital  2P  is constructed from expense on premises 
and equipment divided by their book value6. 
6. Unit price of deposits and acquired funds  3P is calculated by dividing interest 
expense by the sum of amount of deposits, short term and long term 
borrowing, bonds and other borrowed money. 
Note that all items above are adjusted to be in real values (year base 1988). 
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of the Variables 
  C Q1 Q2 P1 P2 P3 
Commercial Mean 5,620 466,000 80,500 160,723 0.058695 0.008675 
Banks Std 5,930 366,000 82,600 222,788 0.039783 0.011113 
        
Government Mean 3,050 2,590 536 155,191 0.068817 0.007210 
Banks Std 2,300 1,970 996 52,245 0.057193 0.003647 
        
Total Mean 5,090 372,000 64,400 159,586 0.060728 0.008381 
 Std 5,480 376,000 80,500 199,951 0.043977 0.010082 
Note: cost and output (C, Q1 and Q2) units in million baht; unit of wage and salary (P1) 
in baht per quarters. 
 
Table 2.2 above shows the summary statistics for the outputs, inputs, and 
prices of inputs separately for commercial and government banks. A few conclusions 
can be drawn from a quick look at the table. On average, commercial banks’ total cost, 
loan, and investment are twice larger than those of government banks. However, 
                                                 
5 The number of employees is reported at the end of each year, so it is assumed to be constant 
throughout the year. 
6 The original cost less depreciation and amortization. 
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prices of inputs, except for wage and salary, paid by commercial banks are slightly 
less than those of government banks. 
Regarding modeling inefficiency, several variables, most of which related to 
the management and operating environment, are assumed to determine inefficiency. 
These factors can be taken into consideration by including dummy variables 
representing ownership. TAKEOVER = 1 if a bank is taken over by foreign investors; 
otherwise, it is equal to zero. It is believed that foreign investors have superior 
managerial quality, tacit knowledge and informational advantages, allowing them to 
outperform local bankers. 
In addition, STATE = 1 if a major share holder of a bank is the government; 
otherwise it takes value of zero. According to incentive theory, it is believed that state-
owned banks suffer from lack of ownership incentives; hence, they are prone to 
perform inadequately. In contrast, banks owned by private stock holder might be 
expected to face stronger incentive to control cost and enhance more efficiency than 
state-owned banks. 
In addition to ownership and governance structures, several other factors that 
may impinge on efficiency are added to the model. Firstly, the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans is used to control for differences in banks’ loan quality. Under the 
“bad management hypothesis” of Berger and DeYoung (1997), loan quality is 
indicative of the quality of bank management. 
Secondly, according to Fillipaki, Margaritis and Staikouras (2009), the number 
of branches for each bank should be taken into consideration because the main reasons 
banks open up new branches are for efficient utilization of excess capacities. However, 
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banks may have strategic motivations to expand their network such as to defend their 
market share. In this case, opening up new branches is not expected to increase banks’ 
efficiency. That inefficiency increases or decreases with the expansion of branching 
network will be reflected by a positive or negative effect of the number of banks’ 
branches. 
Thirdly, the ratio of equity to total assets which is reflective of capital 
adequacy of a bank should be included in the inefficiency analysis as suggested by 
Altunbas, Lui, Molyneux and Seth (2000),. In most cases, well-capitalized banks are 
perceived to be relatively safe, which in turn lowers their cost of borrowing and 
consequently is efficiency enhancing. Therefore, higher levels of capital adequacy are 
expected to impinge positively on efficiency. 
Lastly, according to Fillipaki, Margaritis and Staikouras (2009), the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets, which accounts for different risk preference and risk 
management practices, should be taken into the specification of the inefficiency model 
because it directly affects cost efficiency by providing an alternative to deposits as a 
funding source for loans; it may also reflect the risk-return trade-off that banks face. 
Summarily, the determinant of Thai commercial banks’ inefficiency, equation 
(2), can be written in the specific form as follows: 
 0 1 2 3 4TAKEOVER STATE NPL LOAN BRANCHi i i ii           
   5 6EQUITY ASSET LIQUID ASSETi i     (10) 
where TAKEOVER i  is a binary variable taking value of 1 in subsequent years if the 
ith 
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bank is taken over or acquired by foreign investors, 
STATEi  is a binary variable to distinguish between private banks and state 
banks, 
 NPL LOAN i  is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, 
BRANCHi  is the number of branches, 
 EQUITY ASSET i  is the ratio of share-holder equity to total assets, and 
 LIQUID ASSET i  is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 
However, the inefficiency model for government banks must be written 
differently for various reasons. Basically, the dummy variables for takeover and state 
bank are a null set because no government bank has been taken over. They are also 
100-percent owned by the Thai government. Additionally, the variable 
 NPL LOAN i  is dropped due to incomplete data on amount of their Non-performing 
loan. Hence, the three remaining variables determining inefficiency for the 
government banks are the number of branches, the ratio of share-holder equity to total 
assets and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 
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IV. Estimation Results 
 
First, data poolability of commercial banks and government banks was tested. 
To test, I constructed a common frontier for both commercial banks and government 
banks and various structural tests were undertaken to determine whether commercial 
and government banks come from the same population frontier. Similar to Havrylchyk 
(2006), a number of parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum, 
Kruskal–Wallis, and Kolmogorov–Smirnov) tests were performed against the null 
hypothesis that all banks are drawn from the same population. Table 2.3 presents the 
maximum likelihood parameter estimation of the common cost frontier. The means 
and standard deviations of commercial banks and government banks are shown in 
table 2.4. Finally, table 2.5 shows the results of the tests for data poolability.  
 
Table 2.3: The Pooled Cost Frontier 
 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic P-value 
0  constant 23.80225*** 5.125437 4.64 0 
1  1ln Q  -0.6069432 0.4204108 -1.44 0.149 
2  2ln Q  0.5864876* 0.3050339 1.92 0.055 
1  1ln P  0.2045428 0.4847351 0.42 0.673 
2  2ln P  -1.295936*** 0.4403917 -2.94 0.003 
3  3ln P  2.091394*** 0.3612678 5.79 0 
11   211 2 ln Q  0.0264709 0.0234164 1.13 0.258 
22   221 2 ln Q  -0.0185671* 0.0095643 -1.94 0.052 
12  1 2ln lnQ Q  -0.0003098 0.0144104 -0.02 0.983 
11   211 2 ln P  -0.0142165 0.0242808 -0.59 0.558 
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 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic P-value 
22   221 2 ln P  -0.0234633 0.0725699 -0.32 0.746 
33   231 2 ln P  0.1229434*** 0.0193563 6.35 0 
12  1 2ln lnP P  0.0559804 0.0437894 1.28 0.201 
13  1 3ln lnP P  -0.0836738*** 0.0237404 -3.52 0 
23  2 3ln lnP P  -0.0680066** 0.0347445 -1.96 0.05 
11  1 1ln lnQ P  -0.0002101 0.0190139 -0.01 0.991 
12  1 2ln lnQ P  0.0463461** 0.0197547 2.35 0.019 
13  1 3ln lnQ P  -0.046136*** 0.0150149 -3.07 0.002 
21  2 1ln lnQ P  -0.0051029 0.0147091 -0.35 0.729 
22  2 2ln lnQ P  -0.042858*** 0.0166692 -2.57 0.01 
23  2 3ln lnQ P  0.0479609*** 0.0130986 3.66 0 
1t  T -0.0116196
*** 0.0044211 -2.63 0.009 
2t  
2T 0.0002579*** 0.0000762 3.38 0.001 
1a   1cos y  -0.861401*** 0.0338588 -25.44 0 
1b   1sin y  -0.5622409*** 0.0309905 -18.14 0 
2a   2cos y  -0.1676078*** 0.032549 -5.15 0 
2b   2sin y  0.0761557** 0.0322034 2.36 0.018 
11a   1 1cos y y  -0.2758293*** 0.0227512 -12.12 0 
12a   1 22cos y y -0.1442716*** 0.0183909 -7.84 0 
22a   2 2cos y y  -0.0495058* 0.0261426 -1.89 0.058 
11b   1 1sin y y  -0.0365284 0.0244347 -1.49 0.135 
12b   1 22sin y y  0.0602878*** 0.0161051 3.74 0 
22b   2 2sin y y  -0.0683327** 0.0269911 -2.53 0.011 
 2ln v   -4.98005*** 0.2819226 -17.66 0  2ln u   -1.961155*** 0.0897751 -21.85 0 
      
v   0.0829079 0.0116868   
u   0.3750945 0.0168371   
2 2 2
u v      0.1475696 0.0115008   
u v     4.524231 0.0258748   
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Note: *, **, *** and represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 There are 657 observations. 
 The log likelihood is 50.685. 
 The distribution of inefficiency term is assumed to be half normal. 
 
Table 2.4: Mean and Standard Deviation of Cost Efficiency 
 Pooled frontier 
 Commercial banks  Government banks
mean 1.355444  1.488846 
sd 0.4078303  0.534254 
 
Table 2.5: Summary of the Tests on Cost Efficiency against the Null Hypothesis that 
Commercial Banks and Government-owned Banks Come from the Same Distribution 
 
t-test 
Wilcoxson 
Rank-Sum 
test 
Kruskal–
Wallis 
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov 
 t (prob > t) z (prob > z) χ2 (prob > χ2) D (prob >D) 
test statistics -3.1566*** -3.549*** 12.595*** 0.2287*** 
p-value 0.0017 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000 
Note: *, **, and  *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
From table 2.3, most of the estimated coefficients are significant at 0.99 level 
of statistical confidence. Based on  = 4.52, we can infer that most of the variation 
from the cost frontier is attributed to  inefficiency rather than random noise. In table 
2.4, the means of cost inefficiency of commercial banks and government banks are 
1.35 and 1.48, respectively; their standard deviations are 0.40 and 0.53. This implies 
that on average commercial banks were more successfully capable of operating closely 
to the cost frontier than the government banks. From table 2.5, all tests which are 
applied on the cost-inefficiency measures allow us to reject the null hypothesis at the 
1% significance level.  
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However, one might argue that these tests, used by Havrylchyk (2006), are 
invalid because they, in fact, test against the null hypothesis whether the efficiency 
distributions are similar. When the null hypothesis is rejected, it might be the case that 
their efficiency comes from different distributions or the equations explaining their 
inefficiency have different intercept or means. Yet, I could not conclude that their cost 
frontiers are indeed different from these tests on efficiency distribution. So, I propose 
to perform these tests again on the predicted total cost expenditure rather than the 
efficiency scores. 
 
Table 2.6: Summary of the Tests on Total Cost Expenditure against the Null 
Hypothesis that Commercial Banks and Government-owned Banks Come from the 
Same Distribution 
 
t-test 
Wilcoxson 
Rank-Sum 
test 
Kruskal–
Wallis 
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov 
 t (prob > t) z (prob > z) χ2 (prob > χ2) D (prob >D) 
test statistics 7.3824*** 7.217*** 52.088*** 0.3039*** 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.001 0.0000 
Note: *, **, and  *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
The test results shown in table 2.6 reaffirm the statistical conclusions of table 
2.5. I reject the null hypothesis that their cost expenditures are drawn from the same 
distribution for all tests. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to put all banks under a 
single common frontier. 
Since the statistical tests suggest that commercial banks and government banks 
operate under different technology, we should estimated their cost frontier separately. 
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Again, by using maximum likelihood method, I construct the cost frontiers together 
with the inefficiency models for commercial banks and government banks separately. 
Parameter estimation are shown in tables 2.7 and 2.8. 
 
Table 2.7: The Estimated Cost Frontier for Commercial Banks 
 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic P-value 
Stochastic Cost frontier (equation 3)    
0  constant -47.492*** 13.1838 -3.6 0 
1  1ln Q  4.94398*** 0.99402 4.97 0 
2  2ln Q  0.18515 0.33746 0.55 0.583 
1  1ln P  -0.9232** 0.37213 -2.48 0.013 
2  2ln P  0.54707 0.35509 1.54 0.123 
3  3ln P  1.37617*** 0.24601 5.59 0 
11   211 2 ln Q  -0.0638 0.04847 -1.32 0.188 
22   221 2 ln Q  0.11285*** 0.01888 5.98 0 
12  1 2ln lnQ Q  -0.1122*** 0.01863 -6.02 0 
11   211 2 ln P  -0.0279** 0.01403 -1.99 0.046 
22   221 2 ln P  -0.3606*** 0.03867 -9.32 0 
33   231 2 ln P  0.09546*** 0.00984 9.7 0 
12  1 2ln lnP P  -0.0891*** 0.02325 -3.83 0 
13  1 3ln lnP P  -0.0672*** 0.01353 -4.97 0 
23  2 3ln lnP P  -0.1063*** 0.01951 -5.45 0 
11  1 1ln lnQ P  0.02119 0.01856 1.14 0.254 
12  1 2ln lnQ P  -0.0383* 0.0204 -1.88 0.06 
13  1 3ln lnQ P  0.01715 0.01386 1.24 0.216 
21  2 1ln lnQ P  0.01026 0.01777 0.58 0.564 
22  2 2ln lnQ P  0.00034 0.01765 0.02 0.985 
23  2 3ln lnQ P  -0.0106 0.01018 -1.04 0.298 
1t  T -0.0054
*** 0.0019 -2.86 0.004 
2t  
2T 0.0001*** 3.2E-05 3.16 0.002 
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 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic P-value 
1a   1cos y  -0.0596*** 0.01727 -3.45 0.001 
1b   1sin y  -0.144*** 0.03555 -4.05 0 
2a   2cos y  -0.0164 0.01369 -1.2 0.231 
2b   2sin y  0.05799*** 0.01878 3.09 0.002 
11a   1 1cos y y  0.02726*** 0.00931 2.93 0.003 
12a   1 22cos y y  -0.0248*** 0.00763 -3.25 0.001 
22a   2 2cos y y  0.02509** 0.01068 2.35 0.019 
11b   1 1sin y y  -0.0236*** 0.01168 -2.02 0.043 
12b   1 22sin y y  0.02284*** 0.00668 3.42 0.001 
22b   2 2sin y y  0.00819 0.01217 0.67 0.501 
 2ln v   -5.7701 0.116595 -49.49 0 
Inefficiency model (equation 10)    
0  CONSTANT -1.03717*** 0.372453 -2.78 0.005 
1  TAKEOVER 1.080186*** 0.431281 2.5 0.01 
2  STATE -1.46906*** 0.391788 -3.75 0.00 
3  NPL/LOAN 1.279289** 0.653876 1.96 0.05 
4  EQUITY/ASSET -14.2237*** 3.300632 -4.31 0 
5  LIQUID/ASSET -3.23623*** 1.088508 -2.97 0.003 
6  BRANCH -0.00847*** 0.000881 -9.62 0 
u   0.055852 0.003256   
Note: *, **, *** and represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 The number of observations is 523. 
 The log likelihood is 579.92. 
 The distribution of inefficiency term is assumed to be half normal. 
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Table 2.8: The Estimated Cost Frontier for Government Specialized Banks 
 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic P-value 
Stochastic Cost frontier (equation 3)    
0  constant -85.1997** 39.67668 -2.15 0.032 
1  1ln Q  11.28217*** 4.001251 2.82 0.005 
2  2ln Q  -0.38396 0.45816 -0.84 0.402 
1  1ln P  -1.43976* 0.745476 -1.93 0.053 
2  2ln P  2.582125* 1.365805 1.89 0.059 
3  3ln P  -0.14236 1.05888 -0.13 0.893 
11   211 2 ln Q  -0.68353*** 0.205355 -3.33 0.001 
22   221 2 ln Q  0.013633 0.011959 1.14 0.254 
12  1 2ln lnQ Q  0.007238 0.016059 0.45 0.652 
11   211 2 ln P  -0.1488** 0.059209 -2.51 0.012 
22   221 2 ln P  -0.07091 0.06074 -1.17 0.243 
33   231 2 ln P  0.217084** 0.090458 2.4 0.016 
12  1 2ln lnP P  0.114185 0.094648 1.21 0.228 
13  1 3ln lnP P  0.221348** 0.092159 2.4 0.016 
23  2 3ln lnP P  0.025615 0.041903 0.61 0.541 
11  1 1ln lnQ P  0.222433*** 0.03235 6.88 0 
12  1 2ln lnQ P  -0.19234*** 0.032216 -5.97 0 
13  1 3ln lnQ P  -0.03009 0.037071 -0.81 0.417 
21  2 1ln lnQ P  0.004259 0.017635 0.24 0.809 
22  2 2ln lnQ P  -0.00193 0.022706 -0.09 0.932 
23  2 3ln lnQ P  -0.00233 0.02236 -0.1 0.917 
1t  T 0.006367 0.010421 0.61 0.541 
2t  
2T -2.8E-05 0.000152 -0.19 0.853 
1a   1cos y  -0.05257 0.119746 -0.44 0.661 
1b   1sin y  -0.31278 0.232779 -1.34 0.179 
2a   2cos y  -0.27615** 0.11839 -2.33 0.02 
2b   2sin y  -0.4121*** 0.106224 -3.88 0 
11a   1 1cos y y  -0.06747 0.090338 -0.75 0.455 
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 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error t-statistic P-value 
12a   1 22cos y y  -0.10174 0.063357 -1.61 0.108 
22a   2 2cos y y  0.109957 0.0693 1.59 0.113 
11b   1 1sin y y  -0.1847** 0.085613 -2.16 0.031 
12b   1 22sin y y  -0.18255*** 0.048231 -3.78 0 
22b   2 2sin y y  -0.04983 0.079832 -0.62 0.532 
 2ln v   -5.97734 0.394597 -15.15 0 
Inefficiency model (equation 10)    
0  CONSTANT -3.55694*** 1.277006 -2.79 0.005 
4  EQUITY/ASSET -30.4118 23.9808 -1.27 0.205 
5  LIQUID/ASSET 4.311321 4.478098 0.96 0.336 
6  BRANCH 0.002009 0.001453 1.38 0.167 
u   0.050355 0.009935   
Note: *, **, *** and represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 The number of observations is 134. 
 The log likelihood is 171.69. 
 The distribution of inefficiency term is assumed to be half normal. 
 
The estimation results in tables 2.7 and 2.8 show that most parameters are 
statistically significant. Hence, I use these coefficients to infer about  production 
technology such as scale economies and substitutability among inputs. 
Economies of scale are the cost advantages that a firm obtains from production 
expansion. According to equation (6) together with the estimated coefficients of the 
cost frontiers in tables 2.7 and 2.8, the estimates of scale economies can be derived by 
evaluating at the geometric means of outputs and factor prices.  I find that the scale 
economies of commercial banks and government banks are 0.916 and 1.729, 
respectively. Hence, these results show that commercial banks experience economies 
of scale or increasing return to scale in their production - as they double outputs, their 
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cost increases by less than double; Government banks, on the other hand, face 
diseconomies of scale or decreasing return- as they double outputs, their cost increases 
by more than double. Note, from the summary statistics given in table 2.2, that 
government banks are extremely smaller than private commercial banks; Commercial 
banks’ outputs, loans and investments, are more than a hundred times greater than  
those of government banks. . 
Using equation (6) and (8), I can compute Allen-Uzawa and Morishima 
elasticities of substitutions evaluated at their geometric means of input prices. Tables 
2.9 and 2.10 present Allen-Uzawa and Morishima elasticities for commercial banks and 
government banks, respectively. 
 
Table 2.9: Allen-Uzawa and Morishima Elasticities of Substitution for Commercial 
Banks 
 
 
 
In
pu
t i
 
Input j 
Allen-Uzawa  elasticities of substitution  ij  
 Labor Physical capital Loanable funds 
Labor -3.91 -0.03 0.23 
Physical capital -0.03 -33.78 -0.16 
Loanable funds 0.23 -0.16 -0.30 
Morishima elasticities of substitution  Mij  
 Labor Physical capital Loanable funds 
Labor -3.91 33.75 0.54 
Physical capital 3.87 -33.78 0.13 
Loanable funds 4.14 0.13 -0.30 
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Table 2.10: Allen-Uzawa and Morishima Elasticities of Substitution for Government 
Banks 
 
For commercial banks, by the Allen-Uzawa measure, labor and loanable funds 
are substitutable for each other whereas labor and physical capital and physical capital 
and loanable funds are complementary inputs. However, by Morishima measure, all 
inputs are substitutable for one another. Similarly, for government banks, both Allen-
Uzawa and Morishima elasticities suggest that all inputs are found to be substitutable 
for one another. 
Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution can be used to compute own and cross 
price elasticities for input demands by using the relationship in equation (7). These are 
more interesting economic statistics. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 present the own and cross 
price elasticities for input demands of commercial banks and government banks, 
respectively. 
 
 
In
pu
t i
 
Input j 
Allen-Uzawa  elasticities of substitution  ij  
 Labor Physical capital Loanable funds 
Labor -4.419 0.029 0.944 
Physical capital 0.029 -33.134 0.698 
Loanable funds 0.944 0.698 -0.020 
Morishima elasticities of substitution  Mij  
 Labor Physical capital Loanable funds 
Labor -4.419 33.163 0.964 
Physical capital 4.449 -33.134 0.718 
Loanable funds 5.364 0.718 -0.020 
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Table 2.11: Own and Cross Price Elasticities of Demands for Inputs of Commercial 
Banks 
 
Table 2.12: Own and Cross Price Elasticities of Demands for Inputs of Government 
Banks 
 
From table 2.11, for commercial banks, every own price elasticity is negative, 
so that all factor demands display negative slope i.e. the input quantity demanded 
decreases as the input price increases. The own price elasticity of labor demand is less 
than but very close to unity. The own price elasticity of demand for physical capital is 
substantially greater than one; the demand for physical capital would go up by 3.95% 
if its price went down by only 1%. Nevertheless, demand for loanable funds appears to 
be inelastic because of its close-to-zero own price elasticity. Regarding their cross-
price elasticities, labor and loanable funds are substitutable, whereas labor and 
physical capital and physical capital and loanable funds are complementary. However, 
In
pu
t i
 
Input j 
Own and cross price elasticities of demand for inputs  ij  
 Labor Physical capital Loanable funds 
Labor -0.893 -0.003 0.154 
Physical capital -0.007 -3.959 -0.108 
Loanable funds 0.053 -0.019 -0.199 
In
pu
t i
 
Input j 
Own and cross price elasticities of demand for inputs  ij  
 Labor Physical capital Loanable funds 
Labor -1.245 0.002 0.619 
Physical capital 0.008 -2.071 0.457 
Loanable funds 0.266 0.043 -0.013 
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all of their cross price elasticities are very close to zero, so that it is difficult for 
commercial banks to adjust one input quantity in response to change in another input 
price. 
For government banks, their own and cross price elasticities shown in table 
2.12 are very similar to those of commercial banks; all input demands have negative 
slope; own-price elasticity of demand for labor is close to unity; demand for physical 
capital is highly elastic but demand for loanable funds is inelastic. 
Next, I calculate estimates of technical change using equation (9). The 
technical progress results of commercial banks and government banks are shown in 
table 2.13 and figure 2.1. For commercial banks, technical change results in a decline 
in cost of production throughout the period of study, but cost declines at a slower rate 
as time passes, from 0.53% in the first quarter of 1998 to only 0.12% in the fourth 
quarter of 2009. On the other hand, government banks suffer from an increase in cost 
of production, but the rate of increase tends to decrease over time, from 0.63% in the 
first quarter of 1998 to 0.53% in the fourth quarter of 2009. 
 
Table 2.13: Technical Change for Commercial Banks and Government Banks from 
1998Q1-2009Q4 
Year/Quarter 
Overall technical change 
for commercial banks 
Overall technical change for 
government banks 
1998/Q1 -0.005337 0.006339 
1998/Q2 -0.0052347 0.006311 
1998/Q3 -0.0051324 0.006283 
1998/Q4 -0.0050301 0.006255 
1999/Q1 -0.0049278 0.006227 
1999/Q2 -0.0048255 0.006199 
1999/Q3 -0.0047232 0.006171 
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Year/Quarter 
Overall technical change 
for commercial banks 
Overall technical change for 
government banks 
1998/Q1 -0.005337 0.006339 
1999/Q4 -0.0046209 0.006143 
2000/Q1 -0.0045186 0.006115 
2000/Q2 -0.0044163 0.006087 
2000/Q3 -0.004314 0.006059 
2000/Q4 -0.0042117 0.006031 
2001/Q1 -0.0041094 0.006003 
2001/Q2 -0.0040071 0.005975 
2001/Q3 -0.0039048 0.005947 
2001/Q4 -0.0038025 0.005919 
2002/Q1 -0.0037002 0.005891 
2002/Q2 -0.0035979 0.005863 
2002/Q3 -0.0034956 0.005835 
2002/Q4 -0.0033933 0.005807 
2003/Q1 -0.003291 0.005779 
2003/Q2 -0.0031887 0.005751 
2003/Q3 -0.0030864 0.005723 
2003/Q4 -0.0029841 0.005695 
2004/Q1 -0.0028818 0.005667 
2004/Q2 -0.0027795 0.005639 
2004/Q3 -0.0026772 0.005611 
2004/Q4 -0.0025749 0.005583 
2005/Q1 -0.0024726 0.005555 
2005/Q2 -0.0023703 0.005527 
2005/Q3 -0.002268 0.005499 
2005/Q4 -0.0021657 0.005471 
2006/Q1 -0.0020634 0.005443 
2006/Q2 -0.0019611 0.005415 
2006/Q3 -0.0018588 0.005387 
2006/Q4 -0.0017565 0.005359 
2007/Q1 -0.0016542 0.005331 
2007/Q2 -0.0015519 0.005303 
2007/Q3 -0.0014496 0.005275 
2007/Q4 -0.0013473 0.005247 
2008/Q1 -0.001245 0.005219 
2008/Q2 -0.0011427 0.005191 
2008/Q3 -0.0010404 0.005163 
2008/Q4 -0.0009381 0.005135 
2009/Q1 -0.0008358 0.005107 
2009/Q2 -0.0007335 0.005079 
2009/Q3 -0.0006312 0.005051 
2009/Q4 -0.0005289 0.005023 
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Figure 2.1: Technical Changes for Commercial Banks and Government Banks from 
1998Q1-2009Q4 
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Finally, I focus on cost inefficiency. From the cost-inefficiency model of 
commercial banks in table 2.7, the ratio of non-performing loan to total loan 
(NPL/LOAN) and the dummy variable representing the taken-over banks 
(TAKEOVER) have positive effects on the cost inefficiency, whereas other variables 
including the dummy variable representing the state-enterprise bank (STATE), the 
ratio of equity to total assets (EQUITY/ASSET), the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets and the number of branches have inverse relationship with the cost inefficiency. 
Table 2.14 presents the average cost-inefficiency score for each commercial bank 
together with the average of the inefficiency-determinant variables. 
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Table 2.14: Mean and Standard Deviation of Cost Inefficiency over the Whole Period 
(1998-2009) for Commercial Banks 
Name Inefficiency NPL/ 
Loan 
Equity/ 
assets 
Liquid/ 
Assets 
Branches State Take-
over 
KTB 1.008 0.166 0.072 0.148 665.896 yes no 
SCB 1.022 0.151 0.091 0.111 628.708 no no 
BBL 1.023 0.191 0.068 0.134 654.792 no no 
KBANK 1.024 0.126 0.071 0.140 557.083 no no 
SCIB 1.041 0.193 0.063 0.092 324.958 no no 
TMB 1.051 0.171 0.058 0.066 406.167 no no 
BAY 1.064 0.164 0.067 0.093 464.438 no no 
THANA
CHART 1.112 0.033 0.100 0.129 98.645 
no no 
BT 1.127 0.187 0.033 0.122 110.021 no yes 
KK 1.131 0.116 0.175 0.058 28.235 no no 
UOB 1.189 0.096 0.094 0.208 85.021 no yes 
TISCO 1.190 0.036 0.124 0.042 25.611 no no 
SCNB 1.370 0.100 0.071 0.151 46.854 no yes 
Mean 1.091 0.133 0.084 0.115 315.110 - - 
Std 0.098 0.053 0.034 0.043 248.989 - - 
 
Unsurprisingly, the ratio of NPL to total loan is positively related to cost 
inefficiency and is broadly supportive of the bad management hypothesis of Berger 
and DeYoung (1997), which might suggest that efficient banks trend to perform better 
because they are better in evaluating credit risks. Similarly, the equity-to-total-asset 
ratio has a negative relationship with cost inefficiency on the ground that banks with 
low inefficiency will have higher profit and hence will be able to retain more earnings 
as capital. In addition, the coefficient on the ratio of liquid-asset-to-total-asset is 
negative, probably suggesting that banks that can retain a lot of liquid assets are likely 
to be successful in lowering their financial risks and hence tend to perform more 
efficiently. In addition, the number of branches is found to have a negative impact on 
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bank inefficiency. This is consistent with the presumption that banks are likely to open 
up new branches for efficient utilization of excess capacities. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient on the dummy variable representing state-
enterprise banks is negative, suggesting that state-enterprise banks trend to outperform 
private-owned banks. This fact seems to contradict with the presumption that state 
ownership should be found to be associated with poor economic performance. In this 
study, banks would be categorized as state-enterprises if the Thai government holds 
more than 50% of their shareholder equity. According to this definition, only one 
bank, Krung Thai Bank, is labeled as a state-enterprise bank. For other banks like 
Siam City Bank and Bank Thai, they are not classified as state enterprises even though 
their major shareholder is the Financial Institution Development Fund (FIDF) which is 
the government agency that is independently managed by the board appointed by the 
government. For Thai Military Bank, it is not considered a state enterprise because the 
government is just the major shareholder but it owns only approximately 26% of the 
stock. After 1997 Asian financial crisis, by the prescription of the government, Krung 
Thai Bank merged with smaller insolvent banks. Moreover, Krung Thai Bank was 
better-capitalized than other banks during the period of the crisis because of the 
government financial support. In addition, the government provided the bank with a 
lot of favors including low-cost funding in order to use the bank as a tool to stimulate 
the slow-down economy. This might be why Krung Thai Bank was measured more 
efficient than private-owned banks. 
Similarly, the coefficient on the dummy variable representing banks which are 
acquired by foreign banks has positive sign. This again contradicts our supposition 
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that foreign investors have superior managerial ability, tacit knowledge and 
informational advantages, which allow them to outperform local bankers. The banks 
that were acquired or majorly owned by foreign investors include Bank Thai7, UOB 
Rattanasin8, and Standard Chartered Nakornthon9. The reason why foreigner-owned 
banks show less efficiency than domestically owned banks might be that although 
foreign banks trend to have superior management skill and culture, they might have 
some disadvantages such as less knowledge about the local market. 
As it can be seen from table 2.14, Krung Thai Bank seems to be the most 
efficient bank whose average cost-inefficiency score is at the minimum of 1.008. Since 
cost-inefficiency score represents how much cost firms could reduce given level of 
outputs, if they could have produced on the cost frontier, this result implies that on 
average Krung Thai Bank produces outputs at only 0.8% higher cost relative to the 
cost frontier. Figure 2.1 illustrates the plots of cost-inefficiency scores of the four most 
efficient banks including Krung Thai Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, Bangkok Bank, 
and Kasikorn Thai Bank. It is noteworthy that these four banks also have been 
considered the Big-4 banks in Thailand for many years because of their enormous 
asset and market share10. Note that, from figure 2.2, the vast gaps between the most 
efficient bank and the other 3 banks during the early period of study. However, such 
gaps trend to disappear as time passes, implying that the less efficient banks succeed 
                                                 
7 On November 5, 2008 Bank Thai was acquired by Malaysian CIMB group.  
8 UOB bank was initially Ratanasin Bank. It was acquired by Singaporean United Overseas Banks in 
1998. 
9 In 1999, Singaporean Standard Chartered bank acquired 75% of the shares of Nakornthon Bank. 
10 Chansarn (2008), for example, categorizes Thai commercial banks into 3 groups: large banks 
consisting of Bangkok Bank, Kasikorn Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, and Krung Thai Bank: medium 
bank consisting of Bank of Ayudhaya, Thai Military Bank, Siam City Bank, Bank Thai, and Thanacart 
Bank: small banks consisting of Standard Charter Nakornthon Bank, TISCO Bank, and Kaitnakin Bank.  
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in catching up with the most efficient bank. On the other hand, figure 2.3 shows the 
plots of cost inefficiency of the 4 least efficient banks including Kaitnakin Bank, 
TISCO Bank, UOB Bank, and Standard Charter Nakornthon Bank, together with the 
Krung Thai Bank, the most efficient bank, for comparison. Again, it is noteworthy that 
such 4 banks are often deemed the small-size banks in Thailand, and two of them, 
Kaitnakin and TISCO, are new entries who emerged in the market in 2007. As it can 
be seen from the figure, they do not show any significant trend to move closer to the 
most efficient bank. They go up and down during the period of study. These results 
indicate that size of banks may play an important role in determination of bank 
efficiency. 
In comparison with previous studies, our results show that KTB is the most 
efficient bank, followed by BBL, SCB and KBANK, and also considered the biggest 
four banks. These findings are very similar to previous studies; for example, 
Rangkakulnuwat (2007) found that KTB is the most efficient bank; Chansarn (2008) 
found that the average efficiency of SCB and KBANK is equal to one throughout the 
period (2003-2006) while KTB is the most efficient bank in the years 2004 to 2006.  
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Figure 2.2: Cost Inefficiency of the Four Most Efficient Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Cost Inefficiency of the Four Least Efficient Banks 
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After analyzing cost efficiency of commercial banks, we turn our attention to 
the government-owned specialized banks. From the cost-frontier estimation results in 
table 2.8, we see that the equity-to-total-assets ratio varies inversely with cost 
inefficiency, while the other two variables, liquid-asset-to-total-asset ratio and the 
number of branches, have positive relationship with cost inefficiency. Table 2.15 
below reports the mean and standard deviation of cost inefficiency together with the 
inefficiency-explanatory variables of each government-owned specialized bank. 
 
Table 2.15: Mean and Standard Deviation of Cost Inefficiency for Government Banks 
Name Inefficiency 
Equity/ 
Assets 
Liquid/ 
assets Branches 
EXIM 1.018 0.158 0.108 10.875 
SME 1.042 0.111 0.073 94.160 
GSB 1.057 0.101 0.049 594.844 
GHB 1.082 0.047 0.026 129.966 
BAAC 1.122 0.089 0.069 861.546 
Mean 1.064 0.101 0.065 338.278 
std 0.035 0.036 0.027 331.607 
 
As shown in the table above, on average EXIM Bank appears to be the most 
efficient bank. The equity-to-total-asset ratio has a negative effect on cost inefficiency 
which is the same result as that of commercial banks. However, it is observed that an 
increase in the liquid-asset-to-total-asset ratio will increase cost inefficiency; this 
result is different from that of commercial banks. It implies that government banks 
face the financial constraint of tradeoff between retaining liquid assets and holding the 
less-liquid and higher-risk assets but giving return such as bonds and long-term 
borrowing. In addition, government banks’ branch expansion will result in lower cost 
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efficiency. This result indicates that government banks, unlike commercial banks, 
might increase the number of their branches in order to maintain or increase their 
market share regardless of their potential capacity and efficiency. Figure 2.4 below 
shows the time trends of cost inefficiency of government banks. The time trends of 
cost inefficiency show stable gaps among these banks. EXIM Bank appears to be the 
most efficient bank throughout the period; this might pertain to their few branches and 
high equity-to-total-asset ratio.On the other hand, Bank of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives shows an upward trend over time. Its lower efficiency might be 
attributed to its low equity and the enormous number of  branches (861 branches on 
average). The government encourages BAAC to establish  branches in many districts 
throughout the country in order to facilitate poor farmers  accessible to cheap loans; 
hence, this might be the reason for such excessive number of branches. Regarding the 
pattern of efficiency over time, we observe that the time trends of each government 
bank’s efficiency, different from those of commercial banks, are unsystematic; only 
EXIM bank is consistently ranked as the most efficient bank throughout the period. 
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Figure 2.4: Cost Inefficiency of Government-owned Specialized Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter estimates separate cost efficiency of Thai commercial banks and 
government-owned specialized banks using quarterly data between 1998 and 2010 
employing a Fourier-specified stochastic cost function. Determinants of cost 
inefficiency are included in the specification. The hypothesis that both commercial 
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therefore, the cost frontiers for commercial banks and government banks were 
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banking sector of Thailand for a long. On the other hand, the small and newly 
established banks like Kaitnakin Bank, UOB, TISCO Bank, and SCNB were ranked at 
the bottom in efficiency. These results imply that the size of banks might play an 
important role in determining efficiency. In addition, banks with lower NPL-to-total-
loan ratio, higher equity-to-total-asset ratio, higher liquid-asset-to-total-asset ratio, and 
more branches are likely to be more efficient. However, the results show that state-
enterprise banks and banks which were acquired by foreign investors are less efficient 
than private-owned and local banks. In the very first years after the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis, there were wide gaps between the most and least efficient banks. 
However, these gaps among the group of big banks have disappeared in the recent 
years, whereas the small banks failed to catch up the big banks. 
In addition to the cost inefficiency, from the cost frontier, inferences about 
production technology are possible. Thai commercial banks’ production technology 
exhibits increasing return to scale or economies of scale at their current size, indicating 
further growth in bank size is plausible. By Allen elasticity of substitution, labor and 
loanable funds appear to be substitutable for each other; however, labor and physical 
capital as well as physical capital and loanable funds are complementary. Nonetheless, 
by Morishima elasticity of substitution, all inputs appear to be substitutes for one 
another. 
Among 5 government-owned specialized banks, the most efficient bank is the 
Export-Import Bank of Thailand, followed by Small-and-Medium-Enterprise Bank, 
Government Saving Bank, Government Housing Bank, and Bank of Agriculture and 
Cooperative, respectively. Regarding the factors determining their cost inefficiency, 
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government-owned banks with higher equity-to-total-asset ratio, lower liquid-asset-to-
total-asset ratio, and fewer branches are likely to operate more efficiently. Regarding 
their production technology, in contrast to that of commercial banks, government-
owned banks seem to suffer from diseconomies of scale or decreasing return to scale. 
In their production of loan and investment, all three inputs including labor, physical 
capital and loanable funds appear to be substitutes for each other. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Market-Power versus Cost-Efficiency Effects of 
Concentration on Competition in Thailand’s Banking Sector 
in the Post-Crisis Period (1998-2009) 
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Abstract 
 
The new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) analysis is used to shed light on 
how the effect of a change in the market concentration impacts the degree of 
competition in the banking sector of Thailand after the East Asian financial crisis of 
2007. In addition, inspired by Kubo (2006), his finding of a rising trend of market 
power during the post crisis period is reinvestigated under dramatic changes in the 
competitive environment in terms of ownership structures and regulations. I find that 
the degree of oligopoly power, measured by the Bresnahan (1982)’s conjectural 
parameter, is substantially low, and that the adverse effect of market-power owing to 
the higher market concentration is stronger than the benefit of cost-efficiency effect 
pertaining to the economies of scale. As a result, a small increase in the market 
concentration potentially results in an enormous increase in the markup pricing. 
Interestingly, I reaffirm Kubo’s findings that the degree of market power in the 
banking industry, based on the derived Lerner index, is indeed increasing. However, I 
contradict his claim that the concentration of the biggest banks decreased from 
banking-sector deregulation by showing that, in fact, the concentration ratio of the 
biggest four banks (CR4) has steadily increased after the crisis, resulting in an increase 
in the Lerner index. This occurred mainly because the benefit of cost-efficiency 
resulting from the increased concentration can not offset the unfavorable effect of 
higher market-power associated with the higher concentration. These econometric 
findings might suggest the failure of the Thai government’s attempts to enhance 
competition in the banking industry. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The banking industry is a large component of Thailand’s economy. The size of 
the banking sector, in term of their total assets, accounted for over 100% of GDP 
throughout the period of 1996-200311. Among financial institutions, commercial banks 
have dominated the financial sector in term of size, loans, and deposits. Thus, any 
change in the banking sector will unavoidably and considerably affect the entire Thai 
economy. 
Thailand’s banking industry underwent unprecedented structural changes 
caused by the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the subsequent financial-sector 
reforms directed by the IMF, including dismantling of interest rate controls, 
consolidating and closing weak banks, and relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership, 
foreign-bank entry, and issuing new licenses to establish banks. 
Prior to the crisis, the foreign ownership in financial institution was restricted 
to 25%. In the aftermath of the crisis, this restriction was lifted; foreign investors were 
allowed to hold 100% of equity capital of each bank for a period of 10 years12, 
resulting in an enormous change in the banking business in term of ownership 
structure. Before the crisis, most of the Thai banks were controlled by a few influential 
families; there was no single bank in which a foreign investor was the major 
shareholder. By 2003, foreign investors became the largest shareholders in two banks, 
including the largest bank. There remained only one bank majorly owned by the 
                                                 
11 Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2005) 
12 After 10 years, foreign shareholders could maintain or lower but not raise their stakes in financial 
institutions until the stake is less than 50%. 
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original founding family. As a result of bank consolidation and closure, the number of 
commercial banks declined from 15 in 1996 to 13 by 1997. Out of the 15 commercial 
banks operating in 1996, one was closed, three were merged with government-owned 
banks, two were taken over by the government, and three were acquired by foreign 
banks13. As a consequence of the issuance of brand-new banking licenses, three new 
banks, upgraded from financial companies, emerged in 2005. Certainly, these 
structural changes were expected to have vast implication for concentration and 
competition in the banking sector. 
Even though the banking system has been subject to increasing competition 
pressures due to the financial sector reforms and has become less dominant, 
Thailand’s financial system is still be described as “bank based”. As of 2008, 
commercial banks accounts for 56 percent of financial sector’s assets. Moreover, the 
six largest banks accounted for approximately 70 percent of total loan of the banking 
sector as they did before the crisis14. Hence, the degree of competition in commercial 
banking in the post crisis period is still ambiguous and worthy of our interest. 
To explore the impacts of changes in the business environment resulting from 
the reforms on competition in the banking sector, a number of empirical studies have 
been conducted. However, among the existing literatures most of which use the 
traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, which is cross-sectional 
and descriptive, there are only a few studies which explored quantitatively how 
competition degree evolved after the crisis; none of these studies are able to provide 
explicit numerical results of the effects of changes in the market structure or 
                                                 
13 Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2005) 
14 Kubo (2006) 
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concentration on the competition in the banking industry. Instead, they simply rely on 
concentration indices as a measurement of degree of competition, and attempt to show 
some number as supportive evidences such as market share of assets and loans, 
ownership structure, overhead cost, profit, interest spread, and other market-
performance indicators, based on the assumption of a one-way causal relationship 
between market structure and market performance via market conduct. However, some 
recent studies, for example Bikker (2004), argue that this approach is increasingly 
unreliable, especially when applied to small and less-developed countries. There is 
only Kubo (2006) who applies the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 
approach to estimate the degree of competition econometrically; nonetheless, his 
model does not directly link the market concentration to the competitive degree. 
Hence, there remains room to make contributions in this field by proposing an 
econometric model which can directly link the market concentration to the degree of 
competition, and statistically assess the hypothesis of price-taking behavior in banking 
sector. 
In this chapter, I apply the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 
analysis to explore quantitatively the degree of market power in the banking industry 
and its dynamic evolution in the post-crisis period. This chapter consists of six 
sections. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the two main streams of literature on the 
measurement of competition, called the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm and the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) analysis, and then 
focuses the related literatures on the measurement of competition in the banking sector 
in other countries as well as Thailand. I derive and present the econometric model in 
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section 3.3. Next, the estimation technique and data set are described in section 3.4. 
The estimation results are presented and discussed in section 3.5. Finally, in section 
3.6, I summarize the analysis and offer some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
 
There are two main streams of literature on the measure of competition; one is 
called the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, considered a structural 
approach; another is called the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) analysis, 
regarded as a non-structural approach. 
The SCP paradigm aims at investigating whether a highly concentrated market 
leads to collusion among large firms, causing their market power to increase, thereby 
enhancing market performance in term of higher prices and profitability. Most 
empirical studies applying the SCP paradigm to the banking industry usually use the 
concentration ratio to measure the degree of competition. These studies, based on 
traditional fears of consolidation, view the degree of competition as an increasing 
function of the number of firms in a market and a decreasing function of the average 
market shares. However, some recent studies, Bikker (2004) for example, argue that 
empirical evidence does not support the expected positive relationship between market 
concentration and market power. Furthermore, he argues that the concentration ratio 
should not be counted on when a small number of banks is under consideration; it is 
very likely to exaggerate the degree of competition in small countries, thereby 
probably resulting in measurement problems and misleading inferences. 
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In response to the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of the traditional 
structural models, non-structural models of oligopolistic behavior or the so-called new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approaches, namely the Panzar and Rosse (P-
R) model and the Bresnahan model, have been developed. According to these 
methods, firms’ price-cost margins as well as economic marginal cost (MC) are not 
taken to be observables; the degree of competition or an industry conduct is viewed as 
unknown parameters assessed by direct estimation of the first order condition of profit 
maximizing firms. Grounding in explicit optimization models and equilibrium 
conditions seems to be a major advantage of these approaches, which helps avoid 
making indirect inferences about market power based on indicators of concentration; 
on the other hand, these approaches require detailed information on costs and demand 
based largely on time series data from a single industry. 
The P-R model, introduced by Panzar and Rosses (1987), formulates simple 
models to distinguish between oligopolistic, competitive, and monopolistic markets 
and develops a hypothesis test of their occurrence based on properties of a reduced 
form revenue equation. This test statistic, called the H statistic, corresponds to the sum 
of elasticities of the reduced form revenues with respect to factor prices and serves as 
a measure of competitive behavior of firms in an industry. Alternatively, the 
Bresnahan model, named after Bresnahan (1982), formulates models for profit 
maximizing firms in an oligopolistic market and obtains the first order conditions of 
profit maximization, yielding reduced-form equations to be estimated. The unknown 
parameter called the Bresnahan’s conjectural variation is also econometrically 
estimated and tested. This conduct parameter indicates the extent to which the bank 
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can manipulate the loan supply and the lending interest rate by colluding with other 
banks, and thereby serving as a measure of degree of market power. 
The degree of competition in commercial banking, always a subject of 
controversy, has assumed increasing importance in developed countries like the U.S., 
EU, and Japan. There are substantial relevant literatures on measurement of 
competitive degree in those countries using NEIO approaches. For example, Shaffer 
(1989) has applied the Bresnahan’s technique to the U.S. Banking industry, strongly 
rejecting the collusion but not perfect competition; Bikker and Haaf (2002) estimated 
the P-R model and find that European banking markets are characterized by mopolistic 
competition; Alley (1993) estimated the degree of collusion in the Japanese banking 
sector to find a high degree of collusion in 1986 and 1987. 
Despite abundant empirical literature on Thailand’s banking-sector reform 
after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, there have been few studies which 
quantitatively measured the degree of competition in the banking industry. Most of the 
existing studies focused on issues related to changes in business environments likely 
to affect competition; for example, Anuchiworawong, Souma, and Wiwattanakantang 
(2003) and Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2005) described a decline in family 
ownership from the perspective of corporate governance; Okuda and Rungsomboon 
(2006) found that foreign bank entry led to an increase in overhead costs and a decline 
in profits of local banks. 
Among the existing literature on competition in the Thai banking sector, to my 
knowledge, there is only Kubo (2006) who used the new empirical industrial 
organization approach to study the influence of the crisis and the subsequence reforms 
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on the degree of competition in the Thai banking industry. He applied Bresnahan’s 
(1989) conjectural variation model to estimate Lerner index, for the six largest banks 
in 1993-2004, which measures the markup of price over marginal cost (interest 
margin) indicating the market power of a bank. He presumed that the degree of 
competition should have risen due to the post-crisis financial reforms. Surprisingly, he 
found that Lerner index showed a rising trend during the 2000s, indicating that 
competition in the industry declined despite the financial liberalization in the post-
crisis period. Without statistical analysis on the suspected factors of a change in degree 
of competition due to the shortness of sample period, he verbally attributed a decline 
in competition (the widening interest margin) to a decline in credit worthiness of 
borrowers associated with economic slowdown after the crisis, and the overestimation 
of the Lerner index because of not incorporating effects of a rise in banks’ implicit 
cost of lending resulted from a change in concentration of banks’ loan from corporate 
lending to consumer lending. 
Yet, according to Williamson’s tradeoff-model, the effects of concentration on 
the price-cost margin can be separated into the market-power effect and cost-
efficiency effect. The former will increase the margin because of lower degree of 
competition, while the latter will work in the opposite direction due to scale 
economies. Put simply, in contrast to the certain inverse relationship between market 
concentration and degree of competition predicted by the traditional SCP model, the 
positive relationship of the concentration and the degree of competition (measured by 
the markup price) is possibly observed when the cost-efficiency effect dominates the 
market-power effect; for example, the markup price could go up in spite of a decrease 
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in market concentration. This model might offer an alternative interpretation of the 
rising Lerner found by Kubo (2006) by directly linking the effect of a change in 
market concentration to the change in the degree of competition, which was 
overlooked by Kubo (2006). In so doing, I apply the NEIO model, developed by 
Azzam (1997) from the Bresnahan’s (1982) conjectural variation model, to 
reinvestigate Kubo’s findings. This model can show explicitly and deeply how 
collusively the leading banks can manipulate their output and price setting or whether 
they in fact act as price takers, whether the degree of competition in the banking sector 
actually declined, and finally which effect, market-power or cost-efficiency, has 
driven the observed change in the degree of competition. 
 
3.3. The model 
 
I will follow Azzam (1997) who used the model, firstly devised by Bresnahan 
(1982), to study the U.S. beef packing industry. Unlike Kubo (2006), the model 
developed by Azzam explicitly incorporates the Herfindahl index, as a measure of 
market concentration into the model to examine the direct impacts of the market 
concentration on the degree of competition. Yet, the model in this paper differs from 
Azzam’s model in that I assume that the banking industry is oligopoly in output 
market or Cournot competition, instead of oligopsony in material input market i.e. 
banks are assumed to behave as price-setters in the loan market, while they face a 
given deposit rate on their liabilities. 
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Suppose that the banking sector consists of N banks converting deposits 
regarded as a single material input into loans also regarded as a single final output. 
Each bank’s processing technology is characterized by fixed proportion between 
deposits and loans. Banks can acquire deposits in a competitive market. Nevertheless, 
the loan market is assumed to be oligopolistic. Consider the profit maximization 
problem for the ith bank (for i = 1,2, ..., N). 
      ,i i i ip Q w q C q    v    (1) 
where p is the output price (lending interest rate), 
 w is the price of the raw material input (deposit interest rate), 
 q is the final output (quantity of loan), 
 
1
N
i
i
Q q

   is the industry’s total output (total quantity of loan), 
  iC   is the cost function, and 
 v  is a vector of prices of inputs other than the material input i.e. labor and 
capital. 
Differentiating (1) with respect to iq  yields the first order condition, 
   1 ,i i i iq pp w c qQ     v    (2) 
where   dQ dp p Q   is the elasticity of loan demand to the lending interest rate. 
  Ni j ij i dq dq   is the ith bank conjecture as to its rivals’ response to a 
change in its quantity of loan supplied, that is, Bank ith’s expectation on how other 
banks react to its output change. It is also a measure of collusive behavior in a market.  
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  ,i ic q v  is the marginal cost. 
Assume that the ith firm’s cost function takes the Generalized Leontief functional 
form, 
     1 2 2,i i i ij i j i i i
i j i
C q q v v q v   v
   (3)
 
The optimizing condition (2) becomes 
     1 21 2i i ij i j i i i
i j i
q pp w v v q v
Q
         (4) 
Multiplying (4) by each firm’s market share  iq Q , summing across the N firms, and 
dividing by p yields 
   1 21 2i j iij i
i j i
v vH vM QH
p p
 
    
  (5)
 
 
where  M p w p   is the markup price, 
  2i
i
H q Q  is the Herfindahl index, 
   =    2 2i i ii iq q   is the weighted average of the N firms’ conjectural 
variations, where 1 0  . This parameter indicates the competitiveness of 
oligopoly conduct15, i.e. the extent to which the bank can manipulate the loan supply 
and the lending interest rate by colluding with other banks. 
Equation (5) can be estimated and allows me to test whether banks are price-
takers in the loan market, or that the price equals the marginal processing cost. Perfect 
                                                 
15 It does not infer that all banks necessarily have identical equilibrium conduct (θi). 
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competition is consistent with the case of  i  equal to negative 1 for all banks ith, or   
is equal to negative 1, implying that each bank expects an increase in its loan supply to 
be completely offset by a decrease in other banks’ loan supply, so that the lending 
interest rate remains unchanged. In contrast, the loan market is a Cournot oligopoly if 
i  = 0 for all i, or   = 0.  This means that each bank does not expect its rivals’ supply 
of loan to respond to its own supply of loan. 
In addition, note that equation (5), with the appearance of the Herfindahl index 
on the RHS, is capable of providing a direct link between the degree of concentration 
measured by the Herfindahl index and the market power measured by the markup. 
Note further that the markup is the sum of two components: the first term which is 
defined as a market power component, and the second a marginal cost component, 
which is measured by the last two terms. Differentiation equation (5) with respect to 
the Herfindahl index yields the effect of the market concentration on the markup, 
 1 2 ii
i
vM Q
H p

        (6) 
where the first term is the market-power effect and the second term is the cost-
efficiency effect. According to Williamson’s tradeoff model, these two effects will 
work in the opposite direction. For example, if the market concentration goes up, the 
market-power effect will increase the markup; whereas the cost-efficiency effect will 
decrease the markup. 
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3.4 Econometric application and data 
 
 Econometric application 
 
As I mentioned in the previous section, banks are assumed to be price-takers when 
acquiring deposit but they are not necessarily price-takers when supplying loan. As a 
result of their profit maximization behavior, their price-quantity relationship is given 
by equation (5). I assume that there are two factors of production, labor and physical 
capital; then equation (5) can be rewritten in a specific form as follow, 
   121 21 2 1 2
11 22 12 1 2
1
2 2 2
H v vv v v vM QH QH
p p p p p
    
      
 (7)
 
where 1v  and 2v  are prices of labor and physical, respectively. 
The unknown parameters in equation (7) consisting of  , 11 22 12 1, , , ,      
and 2  can be econometrically estimated. Nevertheless, note that the endogenous 
variable, Q, appears in the RHS. Consequently, a model for Q is required. In fact, 
outside the perfectly competitive markets, firms do not have supply curves given by P 
= MC(Q). Instead, price or quantity-setting conduct follows more-general supply 
relation that is MR = MC16. Hence, I need to specify only the aggregate-demand-for-
loan function. In so doing, I adopt a log-linear demand function depending on its own 
price, price of a substitute, and aggregate income as follow: 
       0 1 2ln ln ln lnaQ l p l p l y      (8) 
                                                 
16 Breshnahan (1989) 
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where ap  is the interest rate of loan from an alternative source, and 
 y  is a variable representing level of income or aggregate production. 
Theoretically, demand function must be linearly homogenous in all prices and 
income, so the demand function (8), after imposing the condition of homogeneity of 
degree zero, can be rewritten as the following17, 
  0 2ln ln ln
a a
p yQ l l
p p
                (9)
 
As an empirical strategy, equation (7) and (9) are to be estimated 
simultaneously by using nonlinear three-stage least-squares (N3SLS)18 because of the 
endogeneity of the quantity and price variables, Q  and p . All exogenous variables 
consisting of 1v , 2v , w , H , ap  and y  are used as instrumental variables.  
 
Data 
The data set is cross-sectional, which covers the four largest commercial banks 
in Thailand consisting of Bangkok Bank, Kasikorn Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, and 
Krung Thai Bank, during the period of 1998 – 200919. These four banks are selected in 
accordance with the bank of Thailand’s peer-group comparison in which large-size 
banks are defined as banks with market share of total assets greater than 10%20. Data 
were acquired from the quarterly financial statement of each individual bank, and the 
                                                 
17 See Varian (1992) Chapter 12. 
18 3SLS combines two stage least squares (2SLS) with seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). The first 
deals with endogeneity problem, while the latter is relevant to the correlation of error terms across 
equations. I use SAS programs to perform the N3SLS estimation in this study. 
19 Kubo (2006) adds two more banks in his study including Bank of Ayudhaya and Thai Military Banks. 
His data span over the period of 1992-2004. 
20 Medium-bank group includes 4 banks with market share of total assets between 3% and 10%. Small-
bank group consists of 6 banks with market share less than 3%. 
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financial statistics published on the bank of Thailand’s website21. The definition of 
variables and their sources are provided in table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1: List of Variables and Their Definitions 
 Definition Source 
p  Minimum loan rate (MLR) Bank of Thailand’s financial statistics 
w  3-month time deposit interest rate Bank of Thailand’s financial statistics 
M  Interest-rate margin  p w p  
1v  Expenses on personnel/ the number 
of employees 
Individual bank’s Quarterly financial 
statements 
2v  Expenses on premises and 
equipment/ value of premises and 
equipment 
Individual bank’s Quarterly financial 
statements 
iq  Loan and accrued interest 
receivables 
Individual bank’s Quarterly financial 
statements 
Q  Total credits of all commercial 
banks 
Bank of Thailand’s financial statistics 
H  CR4 (concentration ratio of the 
biggest four firms) 
 , , ,i
i I
q Q I BBL KBANK SCB KTB


ap  State enterprises’ bond rate
22 Bank of Thailand’s financial statistics 
y  Real GDP Bank of Thailand’s financial statistics 
12 Weighted average interest rates of new issues in each month. Almost all of the state 
enterprise bonds have initial maturities of 3-10 years. 
 
With regard to the price of output ( p ), I use the minimum loan rate (MLR), 
the interest rate at which each bank charge its most favored customers, i.e. those with 
high creditability; higher-risk customers are charged MLR plus their specific risk 
premium; it can be comparable to the prime rate in the US. I choose the interest rate 
paid on 3-month time deposit to represent the price of material input ( w ).  Regarding 
the cost variables, I assume that banks use labor and physical capital, in addition to 
                                                 
21 http://www.bot.or.th/English/Pages/BOTDefault.aspx 
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deposits, in the production of loans. The factor prices, wage ( 1v ) and rent ( 2v ), are 
computed from the expenses on personnel, and expenses on premises and equipment 
divided by the number of employees, and value of premises and equipment, 
respectively. Since information on the Herfindahl index ( H ) for the loan market is not 
available, I use the four-firm concentration ratio for the loan market (CR4) as a 
substitute23. 
In estimating the aggregate demand for loans, the total amount of loans and 
accrued-interest receivables issued by commercial banks registered in Thailand (Q ) is 
obtained from commercial banks’ credits reported on the bank of Thailand’s website. 
Interest rate on state enterprises’ bond is adopted as the price of a substitute for bank 
loans; it is believed that this rate is a good measure (up to monotone increasing 
transformation) of the private-corporate bonds’ rate. Real GDP is chosen to be a 
variable representing aggregate production ( y ). Finally, note that all nominal 
variables like wage and loan are adjusted to be in the real terms by the consumer price 
index (CPI) 24.  Table 3.2 below shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in 
estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Azzam (1997) argued that there are close correlation between CR4 and the Herfindahl index. Also, 
strong correlation between CR3 and the Herfindahl index was found by Bikker and Haff (2002). 
24 2007 is the base year. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Max. Min. 
p  7.59 2.29 15.50 5.50 
w  2.80 2.18 10.00 0.65 
M  0.67 0.14 0.89 0.34 
1v  145,168 34,321 257,326 88,623 
2v  0.05 0.01 0.08 0.03 
Q  5,826,683 596,432 7,127,449 4,559,200 
H  0.52 0.03 0.58 0.46 
ap  5.29 2.68 14.82 2.48 
y  893,576 143,695 1,144,005 658,899 
Note: unit of Q and y in million Baht; unit of v1 in baht. 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
 
Table 3.3 below reports the estimation results. Consider the margin equation 
(equation 7) first. Although most of the cost variables’ coefficients, 22 , 1 , 2 , are 
not significantly different from zero, they are of the correct signs as pointed out by 
Diewert (1971), i.e. 12 0   implies the substitutability between labor and physical 
capital; 11 0  , 22 0   and  212 11 22   ensure that there exists a range of factor 
prices in which the cost function is increasing in the factor prices. In addition, of  
particular interest is the conduct parameter,  , showing the negative sign as expected 
and being in the range between negative 1 and 0 and significantly different from zero 
at the confident level of 99 percent.  Specifically, 0.908    is significantly close to 
negative 1, suggesting that each bank expects an increase in its loan supply to be 
mostly offset by a decrease in other banks’ loan supply. This also implies a low degree 
of oligopolistic behavior in the banking sector. 
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With regard to the estimated aggregate demand for loan (equation 9), the 
estimation results are reasonable. All estimated coefficients, except for the income 
elasticity ( 2l ), have the expected sign, although the income elasticity is not 
significantly different from zero. The price elasticity ( ) is negative 0.154 and 
statistically significant different from zero; on the other hand, the income elasticity 
turns out to be negative 0.032, but it is not significantly different from zero. These 
estimation results suggest that the demand for loan is highly inelastic with respect to 
both price and income. 
 
Table 3.3: Results of Estimation (Margin and Demand equation) 
Item Parameter Estimate Standard Error
Margin equation:   -0.908*** 0.056 
(equation 7) 11  -0.00033* 0.0002 
 22  -3427.48 2553.2 
 12  1.278* 0.794 
 1  -5.56E-09 5.74E-09 
 2  0.0177 0.056 
    
Demand equation: 0l  11.425
*** 0.2377 
(equation 9)  -0.154*** 0.0497 
 2l  -0.032 0.0209 
    
Market-power effect:  0.593  
Cost-efficiency effect:  -0.084  
Total effect:  0.509  
*,**, and *** indicate that parameters are statistically significant at confidence level 
of 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively. 
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From these estimation results, the tradeoff between market-power effect and 
cost-efficiency effect from increased market concentration can be assessed using 
equation (6). The point estimates of the market-power effect and the cost-efficiency 
effect, evaluated at the sample mean value of lending interest rate, factor prices, and 
total amount of loan, are 0.593 and negative 0.084, respectively. Therefore, the 
resulting net effect of an increase in the market concentration on the markup is 0.509, 
suggesting that the benefit of the higher concentration in terms of cost efficiency is 
insufficient to offset the unfavorable effects of increased market power. Consequently, 
an increase (decrease) in market concentration will be inevitably accompanied by an 
increase (decrease) in the markup. This result is evidence in favor of the long-held 
view of the traditional SCP hypothesis that the structure and the market performance 
are positively related. 
Because I have a panel-data set, my estimated econometric results can be used 
to explore the dynamic evolution of competition in the banking sector in the post crisis 
period, i.e. 1998-2009 and to compare these results with the previous study by Kubo 
(2006). Figure 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the plots of concentration ratio (CR4) and the 
Lerner index against time, respectively. 
First of all, I observe that the concentration ratio CR4 of the Thai banking 
industry, as a structural measure of oligopolistic degree in the market, varying around 
0.5 during the post crisis period, is as high as developed countries25. Preceded by small 
fluctuation in the early years of the post crisis period, the concentration ratio still 
shows a steadily rising trend. Surprisingly, the market structure appears to be even 
                                                 
25 Bikker and Haff (2002) report CR3 of the banking sector in 23 developed economies, like USA, UK 
Australia, Korea, and European countries, of which the average number is 0.49. 
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more concentrated over time despite the banking-sector reform, including relaxing 
restrictions on entry to the market, initiated by the Thai government in 2004. This can 
be interpreted by the fact that emerging banks such as Thanachart, Kaitnakin, and 
TISCO, all of which were upgraded from financial companies to commercial banks, as 
well as banks merged with and acquired by foreign banks like UOB Rattanasin, 
CIMB, and Standard Chartered Nakornthon, are so small in both size and market 
share26 that their entry seems not seriously threatening to the biggest-four incumbents.  
Next, I employ the Lerner index to analyze the dynamic evolution of the 
market power in the banking sector in the post-crisis period. Usually, the Lerner index 
is defined as  P MC P , ranging from a high of one to a low of zero with a higher 
number indicating greater degree of market power. For a perfectly competitive market, 
in which P = MC, the Lerner index is equal to zero. According to the first-order 
condition of profit maximization given by equation (1)-(5), the Lerner index can be 
specifically written as 
 1t
t
t
Hp MCL
p 
     
 ; t time  (10) 
Note that, from this formula, the Lerner index increases or decreases 
proportionally with the degree of market concentration27, as measured by the 
Herfindahl index (H) or the CR4 as a substitute. The computed Lerner index starting 
from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2009 are plotted in figure 3.2. 
                                                 
26 In December 2009, amount of loan issued by Thanachart, Kaitnakin, and TISCO accounts for only 
4.11%, 1.24% and 1.6% of the total loan in the market, respectively. For UOB Rattanasin, CIMB, and 
Standard Chartered Nakornthon, the market shares are 2.05%, 1.15%, and 1.17%, respectively. 
27 This is because θ and η are constant i.e. they are estimates of average the conduct parameter and price 
elasticity of demand for loan over the period. I note this in section 3.6. 
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Just like the market concentration ratio, the Lerner index has kept steadily increasing 
in the post-crisis period, from slightly  lower than 0.30 to as high as 0.35. This 
confirms Kubo (2006)’s finding that the Lerner index rose continually in the post-
crisis period (from 1999 on), implying a continuous decrease in competition in the 
banking sector, despite changes in competitive environment in term of ownership 
structures and regulations. He was surprised by this fact since he presumed that the 
deregulation in financial sector after the crisis should lead to the lessening degree of 
structural concentration in the market; yet, he did not provide any concrete evidence to 
support his claim. Using the CR4 as the measure of concentration, I find that the 
market concentration is indeed increasing rather than decreasing after the crisis as 
plotted in figure 3.1. This direct linkage between market concentration and market 
power, ignored by Kubo, is a critical key interpretation of a rise in market power. As a 
consequence of rising market concentration, together with estimation results showing 
that the cost-efficiency effect is dominated by the market-power effect, the rising trend 
of the derived Lerner index, or a decline in the degree of competition, is observed after 
the post crisis period. That the estimated degree of market power or the derived Lerner 
index is increasing is consistent with the fact that the actual markup price in the 
banking industry is increasing as illustrated by the rising trend, from 30% to nearly 
90% by the fourth quarter of 2009, in figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.1: Concentration Ratio of the Biggest Four Banks (CR4) 
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Figure 3.2: The Derived Lerner Index 
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Figure 3.3: The Markup 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I investigate the degree of competition in the banking sector of 
Thailand over the years 1998-2009, the post East Asian financial crisis period. A 
previous study by Kubo (2006), covering the pre and post crisis periods i.e. 1992-1997 
and 1998-2004, shows the rising trend of market power, indicated by his derived 
Lerner index, during the post crisis period in spite of dramatic changes in competitive 
environment in term of ownership structures and regulations. I adapt Azzam (1997)’s 
competition model and the concept of Williamson’s tradeoff-model to further study 
this phenomena by separating the effect of a change in market concentration on the 
margin into the market-power effect and the cost-efficiency effect. 
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The estimation results show that, based on the Bresnahan’s conjectural 
variation parameter, the degree of competition in the banking industry is vigorous; a 
decline in a bank’s loan quantity will be mostly offset by an increase in loan supply of 
its rivals. In addition, my findings show that the market-power effect appears to be 
intensely stronger than the benefit of the cost-efficiency effect of larger banks, leading 
to a positive relationship between the margin and the degree of market concentration, 
implying that a higher market concentration is unfavorable. 
Based on the concentration ratio, CR4, I show that the market concentration is 
indeed increasing in the post crisis period despite some new entries into the market. As 
a result of higher concentration ratio, the market power of the biggest four banks, 
indicated by the derived Lerner index, is remarkably increasing. This reaffirms Kubo 
(2006)’s findings. However, unlike Kubo, I provide evidence of higher concentration 
ratio and an estimated relationship between the higher concentration ratio and the 
margin. 
Summarily, despite the Thailand government’s efforts to increase competition 
in the banking industry by relaxing restrictions on entry to the market after the 
financial crisis, the oligopolistic degree of the biggest four banks has intensified. Even 
though the competition degree of Thailand’s banking sector is still considerably high 
and may have been even higher without the government actions, borrowers and banks’ 
customers are likely to suffer from a widening interest-rate margin associated with 
increased market power over time. In order to protect them and enhance market 
efficiency in the long term, more market interventions and reforms by the Thai 
government and the Bank of Thailand are needed. The government should introduce 
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new appropriate policies or financial development plans to promote financial 
liberalization and to lessen the concentration of the large banks. 
However, there are two main caveats of the model and results. First, the 
Bresnahan’s conjecture is treated as a constant; in fact, it is very likely that this 
conduct parameter varies with the degree of concentration. Second, in the analysis of 
dynamic evolution of competition degree, I use the estimated coefficients, the price 
elasticity of demand for loan and the conduct parameter, to compute the quarterly 
Lerner index in equation (10); however, these parameters are treated as constants over 
the period; they are estimates of average price elasticity and conduct over the period of 
study; in other words, I assume that the structure of relationship has not changed over 
time. These issues are left as a task for future research. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy in 
Thailand incorporating Commercial Banks’ Efficiency and 
Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
89
Abstract 
 
This chapter studies the monetary transmission in Thailand using a VAR model and 
impulse response analysis taking into account the roles of bank efficiency and 
competition. The empirical results indicate that an unexpected tightening monetary 
policy shock leads to higher financial costs in the banking industry, forcing banks to 
compete more fiercely and operate more efficiently, significantly helping grease and 
strengthen the transmission of monetary policy. Thus, I suggest that the bank of 
Thailand attempt to improve efficiency and competition in the banking sector in order 
to strengthen monetary transmission. 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
The banking sector plays significant roles in Thailand’s economy. It is a major 
source of funding for both private consumption and investment. In addition, it acts as 
an instrument for the Bank of Thailand (BOT) in facilitating the transmission of 
monetary policy. 
After the IMF program in May 2000, Bank of Thailand announced the 
adoption of inflation-targeting regime under which the bank claimed that inflation 
targeting would operate successfully and help rebuild confidence in the central bank 
and maintain stability of price and the financial system. In conducting monetary policy 
under the inflation-targeting framework, the monetary policy stance is signaled 
through an increase or decrease in the policy interest rate (the 14-day bilateral 
repurchase rate), whose impact channels through the cost of lending and borrowing, 
then transmitting to the adjustments in consumption and investment, and ultimately 
affecting production and inflation. For example, when the central bank decides to 
decrease the policy rate, adjustments in short-term money market rates occur.  Given 
that prices are sticky, real interest rates (i.e. inflation adjusted nominal interest rates) 
decline firstly in the short-run then in the long-run, in line with the term 
structure.  Part of these adjustments can be explained through portfolio management of 
financial institutions in order to maintain competitiveness and generate profit and 
ultimately result in a decline in deposit and lending rates. Then, a decline in real 
interest rate will lower the opportunity cost in consumption and investment causing 
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private domestic demand to expand.  Subsequently, the economy grows at a higher 
pace and inflationary pressures increase. 
It is noteworthy that adjustment of the lending interest rate (considered an 
output price of financial institutions) in response to a change in the repurchase rate 
(considered a part of marginal cost to financial institutions) is of great importance. In a 
perfectly competitive market, any profit-maximizing producer is a price taker facing a 
market price equal to its marginal cost; any change in an industrial-wide marginal cost 
will be promptly and fully transmitted to the market price due to price flexibility. On 
the other hand, in a monopolistic or oligopolistic market where market power can be 
exercised, marginal-cost pricing is unlikely to be sustained; for example, sellers who 
are price setters may charge different prices to different consumers and refuse to 
appropriately lower their price despite the fact that a large decline in their marginal 
cost is observed; this may create market friction and hinder the adjustment process. As 
a result, lending rates may not promptly and fully adjust to the changes in money 
market rates. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that an increase in the degree of 
competition in the banking industry might facilitate implementation of the central 
bank’s monetary policy through greasing the banks’ interest-rate adjustment. 
Moreover, competition is generally regarded as a favorable force in most industries 
including banking because it is supposed to foster and boost efficiency, which is 
regarded as another potential force reducing the adjustment cost and increasing the 
degree of interest rate pass-through. Evidently, in order to attain this goal, the Thai 
government has unprecedentedly implemented liberalization in financial sector since 
the end of the IMF era in 2000s, including dismantling of interest rate controls, 
  
92
relaxing restrictions on foreign-bank entry, and issuing new licenses to establish 
banks. 
 
Obviously, monetary policy is not exempt from the effect of competition in 
financial markets. As a result, a number of recent research articles attempt to establish 
empirically the relationship of financial-market structure and the degree of lending-
rate stickiness, and their roles in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. For 
instance, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) study how market concentration, efficiency, 
and barriers to entry in banking sector affects the degree of stickiness of bank lending 
rate with respect to changes in money market rates in 31 countries. Also, Disyatat and 
Vongsinsirikul (2003) employ the dynamic multiplier method and the error correction 
model to analyze the size and speed of the interest-rate pass-through in Thailand. 
Later, Charoenseang and Manakit (2007) reinvestigate the relationship of various 
financial-market interest rates and the Bank of Thailand 14-day repurchase rate, during 
2000-2006 i.e. in the inflation targeting era. Note that, in these studies, the role of 
financial-market structure is not directly incorporated in the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy, that is, they do not examine how the financial market structure 
together with the speed and size of the pass-through affects the adjustment of 
aggregate output and the price level which are the final targets of monetary policy. 
For analyzing the transmission mechanism and evaluating of monetary policy, 
prior to the 1970s, the traditional structural multi-equation models like the Cowles 
commission model was firmly established in the field of macroeconometrics; however, 
the Cowles commission practice was critically attacked on both empirical and 
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theoretical grounds by Lucas (1976). Nowadays, Vector Autoregression (VAR), 
proposed by Sim (1980), has become a household name. While the typical large multi-
equation econometric models depend on theoretical assumptions, the non-theoretical 
VAR models are actually data-determined. They are the dynamic system of equations 
of the interrelationships between economic variables with few theoretical assumptions 
about the underlying economic structure, which are suitable for the limited priori 
knowledge for modeling the transmission mechanism in many developing countries 
including Thailand. For example, Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) study the 
transmission mechanism under various channels through which monetary shocks are 
potentially propagated, such as the bank lending channel, the exchange rate channel, 
the asset price channel, and the direct interest rate channel. Also, Charoenseang and 
Manakit (2007) show that the transmission of monetary policy through the interest rate 
channel seems to be weak; nonetheless, the credit channel through the commercial 
banks’ lending is interestingly significant. Even though they recognize that the 
banking sector plays a vital role in monetary policy transmission, they, as previously 
mentioned, do not directly incorporate the competition degree and efficiency of 
banking sector into their VAR models; instead, they employ the dynamic multiplier 
and error correction approaches to measure the speed and size of interest rate 
adjustment separately. 
Unarguably, understanding the complete picture of the roles of competition 
and efficiency in the banking sector on the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy is greatly important to monetary authorities. This chapter is intended to 
investigate the interdependencies of efficiency and competitiveness in banking sector 
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and the transmission of monetary policy in Thailand. Equipped with the VAR model 
and competition as well as efficiency indices28, I will be able to explore and 
quantitatively gauge the overall impact of monetary policy taking into fully account 
the roles of competition and efficiency in the banking industry. 
This rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly discusses 
related literature. Section 4.3 describes methodology, model specification and data. 
Section 4.4 and 4.5 provide the empirical results, robustness and specification issues, 
respectively. Finally, conclusion is given in section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
Whether the market is competitive and efficient is an interesting question in the 
banking industry. Many approaches to answer this question have been developed, for 
example, the New Empirical Industrial Organization Analysis (NEIO) for the first and 
the Stochastic Frontier Analysis for the latter. Berger and Humphrey (1997) and 
Bresnahan (1989) provide a good review in measuring banks’ efficiency and 
competition, respectively. The traditional belief is that competition fosters economic 
efficiency and is good for the banking industry. Casu and Girardone (2009) test the 
casual relationship of competition and efficiency. Using the cross-country data on cost 
efficiency obtained from stochastic cost frontiers and the estimated Lerner index 29of 
banking sector, they employ the Granger-causality test and find a positive causation 
                                                 
28 I use the Lerner index and cost efficiency, estimated in chapter 2 and chapter 3, as indices of 
competition and efficiency, respectively. 
29 The Lerner index is defined as the difference between output price and marginal cost over price and 
can be used as an indication of market-power degree. 
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between market competition and efficiency, even though the causality running from 
efficiency to competition is weak. 
Recognizing the role of competition in the banking sector on the effect of 
monetary policy, several researchers have attempted to investigate the impact of bank 
competition on monetary policy transmission. For instance, Stiglitz and Greenwald 
(2003) show that in a competitive banking sector the effect of raising interest rate on 
bank lending is weaker than in a less competitive banking sector. Similarly, Freixas 
and Rochet (1997) suggest that a high degree of bank competition decrease the effects 
of the interbank rate on the lending rate. On the other hand, Alencar and Nagane 
(2004), using the dynamic general equilibrium model, demonstrate that increased bank 
competition causes the economy to be more sensitive to interest rates. This finding 
contradicts those of the first two studies. As a result, Gunji, Miura and Yuan (2009) 
use cross-country data to reinvestigate the impact of bank competition on the effect of 
monetary policy. They measure the degree of bank competition by their estimated 
Panza and Rosse’s (1987) H-statistic and an index of monetary policy shocks by the 
cumulative impulse response function of the interest rate equation in a VAR model for 
each country. Their results suggest that competition in banking industry leads to 
smaller monetary policy effects on bank lending. 
However, the opposite implication is suggested by Cottarelli and Kourelis 
(1994) who study how the financial structure affects the degree of stickiness of bank 
lending rates, that is, the speed at which bank lending rates adjust to their long-run 
equilibrium after a shock affecting money market rates in 31 industrial and developing 
countries, by regressing the lending rate on the distributed lag of money market rates. 
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They obtain the so-called “estimated dynamic multipliers” as indicators of the degree 
of lending-rate stickiness. They find that the degree of stickiness in the short run is, on 
average, relatively high, while the lending rate appears to adjust fully in response to 
the money market rate. In addition, they regress the dynamic multipliers on variables 
related to the structure of financial system, for instance the degree of concentration, 
the existence of barriers to entry and the efficiency of the money market; their results 
suggest that the transmission of monetary policy can be enhanced by removing 
barriers to entry and enhancing competition. 
Similarly, Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) employ the dynamic multiplier 
method and the error correction model to analyze the size and speed of the interest-rate 
pass-through in Thailand. They find that the pass-through from the 14-day repurchase 
rate to the 3-month deposit rate and the lending rate is quiet low; by comparing their 
results with those of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), they conclude that the speed and 
size of interest-rate pass-through in Thailand is slower and smaller than most 
developed countries. By splitting the sample into the pre-and-post financial 
liberalization periods (pre-and-post the 1997 financial crisis) and comparing the results 
between the two periods, they find that the speed and size of the interest-rate 
adjustment increases after financial liberalization. Unlike Cottarelli and Kourelis 
(1994), they verbally attribute the lower stickiness to the more competitive market 
structure of banking system without econometric estimation. However, this attribution 
seems to contradict with the findings of Kubo (2006) that suggest the less competitive 
market structure of banking industry after the 1997 financial crisis.  Later, 
Charoenseang and Manakit (2007) reinvestigate the relationship of various financial-
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market interest rates and the Bank of Thailand 14-day repurchase rate, during 2000-
2006 i.e. in the inflation targeting era, using cointegration and error-correction 
procedures; they reaffirms the results of  Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) that the 
pass-through effect is quite low. 
Regarding macroeconomic studies on the transmission of monetary policy, 
prior to the 1970s, much of the early empirical work was concerned with estimating 
structural parameters in the multi-equation Cowles Commission-style models regarded 
as the structural models. However, such complicated models of economies, containing 
in some cases thousand of variables, did not perform very well in forecasting and were 
severely criticized by Lucas (1976) and Sims (1980). Lucas (1976) points out that the 
coefficients of such structural models describing the impact of monetary policy on 
macroeconomics variables of interest are inappropriately treated structurally invariant; 
they actually depend on monetary policy regimes; shifting regime requires different 
parameterization. Hence, a model estimated under a specific regime cannot be used to 
simulate the impact of a different monetary policy regime. The other criticism was 
directed toward the requirement of priori theoretical restrictions on endo-exogenous 
variables. The Cowles Commission practice was viewed as inappropriate in a seminal 
paper by Sims (1980), in which the new methodology of Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) modeling was first formulated. The Sims modeling methodology requires no 
theoretical restrictions or endo-exogenous divisions of variables. This is why the Sims 
methodology is often called the non-structural approach. The VAR models, in which 
each variable is considered an endogenous variable and regressed on lag value of itself 
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as well as other variables, require no priori knowledge to specify theoretical 
restrictions and endo-exogenous variables. 
Several recent VAR literatures applied in the US focus on identifying 
monetary policy shocks with the functioning of the bank reserves market. Studies 
include Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996). The main purpose of these papers is to use the VAR 
model to evaluate the implied dynamic response of the economy to monetary policy 
action affecting bank reserve market under different hypotheses of central bank 
behavior. 
In Thailand, a number of studies apply VAR to analyze monetary policy 
shocks after the Bank of Thailand adopted the inflation-targeting monetary policy 
regime under which monetary authorities are supposed to react endogenously to 
macroeconomic variables. 
Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) use the VAR model to investigate how 
monetary policy shocks channel to the real activity. They extract the following 
stylized fact of the Thai economy; firstly, investment is more sensitive to monetary 
policy shocks than private consumption, export, and import; secondly, the aggregate 
price level responds very little and the aggregate output follows a U-shaped response; 
finally, the impacts of monetary policy channeling through bank loan appear to be 
stronger than interest rate, asset prices, and real exchange rate; hence, they recognize 
that banking sector acts as an important conduit for monetary policy in Thailand. 
Charoenseang and Manakit (2007) also use the VAR model to investigate the 
impacts of monetary policy shocks through bank credit and interest rate channels. 
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They found that the transmission of monetary policy through the interest rate channel 
has become weak after the inflation targeting has been adopted. On the other hand, the 
credit channel through bank lending appears to be very strong. Their results are  
consistent with Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003). 
Note that those authors, Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) and Charoenseang 
and Manakit (2007), do not directly introduce variables representing banks’ efficiency 
and competition into their VAR models, even though, in their studies, VAR models 
are used to evaluate the transmission and impact of monetary policy; instead, they 
analyze the impact of banks’ efficiency and competition on the degree of the pass-
through separately. Compared to their approaches, I look at the direct and indirect 
impacts of competition and efficiency in banking sector on aggregate output and price 
by introducing variables representing banks’ competition and efficiency into the VAR 
model. VAR modeling allows me to place minimal restrictions on how banks’ 
competition and efficiency affect the whole economy given limited knowledge of their 
roles in the transmission mechanism and seems to be a distinct advantage. 
To examine the roles of banks’ competition and efficiency in the transmission 
mechanism, I begin with estimating a baseline VAR model including private demand, 
price level, the monetary policy rate, banks’ lending, banks’ efficiency, and banks’ 
competition. Next, I compare the output and prices responsiveness to the monetary 
shocks when competition and efficiency variables are exogenized or blocked off with 
the baseline response when banks’ competition and efficiency are allowed to operate. 
Differences in the path - speed and size - of output and price give an indication of the 
importance of competition and efficiency in facilitating the transmission of monetary 
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policy. Bayoumi and Morsink (2001) and Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003) also 
applied this method to analyze the importance of a particular channel, like interest 
rate, real exchange rate, and asset price, as a conduit for monetary policy to the real 
economy.   
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
The VAR Specification 
 
In this section, I begin with specifying my VAR model which includes 
economic activity, prices, monetary policy rate, bank credit, bank efficiency, and bank 
competition. The first four variables commonly appear in most existing VAR models. 
The last two variables are introduced, so that I can analyze their roles in facilitating 
monetary policy transmission. The measure of economic activity is real private 
demand – real GDP minus government spending – because public sector demand is 
primarily driven by exogenous fiscal policy. I use the consumer price index as an 
indicator of price level and inflation. The measure of monetary policy stance is the 14-
day repurchase rate. The measure of bank credit is given by the total credit issued by 
all commercial banks registered in Thailand. The measure of bank efficiency is the 
average cost efficiency obtained from the stochastic cost frontier estimated in chapter 
2. The definition of variables and their sources are summarized in table 4.1 below and 
the data set is provided in the appendix. The measure of bank competition is defined as 
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the Lerner index estimated in chapter 3. Hence, my six-variable VAR model can be 
written as follows: 
  0 1 1 ...t t t p t p t     y B y B y B y ε     (1) 
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ty  is a vector of  6 variables in the system at time t containing real private 
demand (PD), consumer price index (CPI), 14-day repurchase rate (RP), banks’ credit 
(CREDIT), banks’ efficiency (EFFICIENCY) and banks’ competition (LERNER). tε  
is a vector of structural shocks with a variance-covariance matrix of  t tE  ε ε I . iB  
for 1,...,i p  are 6 6  matrix of coefficients. The VAR system in (1) can be rewritten 
in the reduced form as follow: 
  1 1 2 2 ...t t t p t p t      y A y A y A y u    (2) 
where tu  is the vector of reduced-form residual with variance-covariance matrix 
 t tE  u u Ω . Defining   10 0 A I - B  implies that 0i iA A B  for 1,...,i p . Hence, 
the structural shocks and the reduced-form residuals are related by 
  0t tu A ε        (3) 
  and  0 0Ω A A      (4) 
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Table 4.1: List of Variables and Their Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
PD  Real private demand (real 
GDP minus government 
spending) 
Office of the national economic and 
social development board 
CPI  Consumer price index (Quarter 
2 of 2007 is base ) 
Thailand bureau of trade and economic 
indices 
RP  14-day repurchase rate Bank of Thailand’s financial statistics 
CREDIT  Total credit issued by  
commercial banks 
Bank of Thailand’s financial statistics 
EFFICIENCY  Average cost efficiency of 
commercial banks 
Estimated in chapter 2 
LERNER  Lerner index Estimated in chapter 3 
 
Lag-structure Specification 
 
The estimation of the reduced form in (2) is done using quarterly data from 
1998Q1 to 2009Q4. In order to specify the optimal lag length, I consider various 
criteria including likelihood-ratio test (LR), Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC), and Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQ). The results provided by Eview7 are shown in table 4.2 
below. 
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Table 4.2: Optimal-lag Criteria 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
    
Endogenous variables: PD CPI RP CREDIT EFFICIENCY LERNER 
  
Exogenous variables: C  
    
Date: 01/25/11   Time: 17:01 
    
Sample: 1998Q1 2009Q4 
    
Included observations: 43 
    
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -1102.790 NA 1.01e+15 51.57163 51.81738 51.66225 
1 -904.5549 331.9286 5.41e+11 44.02581 45.74605* 44.66018 
2 -874.2295 42.31441 7.78e+11 44.28975 47.48448 45.46787 
3 -837.4425 41.06464 9.87e+11 44.25314 48.92237 45.97500 
4 -760.2539 64.62297* 2.66e+11 42.33739 48.48111 44.60301 
5 -693.4457 37.28830 2.25e+11* 40.90445* 48.52267 43.71381* 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
   
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
  
 FPE: Final prediction error 
    
 AIC: Akaike information criterion 
    
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
    
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
   
       
 
Note that the LR test and SC suggest four and one lag, respectively, whereas 
all other criteria suggest five lags. If too many lags are included, I run into degrees of 
freedom problem. Thus, in order to satisfy the parsimonious principle, one lag 
suggested by SC seems most appealing; however, I feel uncomfortable with one lag 
because it is too short to capture the underlying dynamic structure of the system. In 
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addition, all these criteria are subject to criticisms, so they should be regarded as 
guides rather than hard-fast rules. I decide to include two lags in the VAR system for 
two reasons; first, many previous studiess such as Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003), 
Bayoumi and Morsink (2001), and Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998) used two lags in 
their VAR analysis of Thailand, Japan, and EU, respectively; second, the estimated 
VAR is non-stationary if only one lag is included; it becomes stationary when two lags 
are included. The AR roots table and graph are shown in tables 4.3 and figure 4.1, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4.3: The AR Root Table 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: PD CPI RP CREDIT
EFFICIENCY LERNER 
Exogenous variables: C 
Lag specification: 1 2 
Date: 01/25/11   Time: 18:18 
Root Modulus 
0.997119 0.997119 
0.724625 - 0.265006i 0.771563 
0.724625 + 0.265006i 0.771563 
0.757660 - 0.059276i 0.759975 
0.757660 + 0.059276i 0.759975 
-0.544921 - 0.044304i 0.546719 
-0.544921 + 0.044304i 0.546719 
0.091782 - 0.491968i 0.500456 
0.091782 + 0.491968i 0.500456 
-0.370188 - 0.261520i 0.453246 
-0.370188 + 0.261520i 0.453246 
0.248416 0.248416 
No root lies outside the unit circle. 
VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Figure 4.1: The AR Root Graph 
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Note that all 12 roots shown in table 4.3 have modulus less than one and lie 
inside the unit circle as shown in figure 4.1, so the estimated VAR is stable 
(stationary) when two lags are included. The stationary of VAR system is necessary to 
validate the impulse response and accumulated response analysis. 
 
Stationary and Cointegration Tests 
 
Generally, regression models for non-stationary variables give spurious results. 
As a result, the conventional Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates are not 
consistent. Most macroeconomic and time-series variables usually exhibiting strong 
trend are not stationary and are thus not amenable to the VAR analysis. Hence, it is 
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imperative for time-series analysis to test whether variables in a model are stationary. I 
perform the augmented Dickey-Fuller test on each variable against the null hypothesis 
that the variable has a unit root (non-stationary). The results for private demand (PD), 
consumer price index (CPI), 14-day repurchase rate (RP), banks’ loan (CREDIT), 
banks’ efficiency (EFFICIENCY), and banks’ competition (LERNER), are shown in 
tables 4.4 – 4.9, respectively.  
 
Table 4.4: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on Private Demand (PD) 
Null Hypothesis: PD has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.045612  0.0137 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.165756  
 5% level  -3.508508  
 10% level  -3.184230  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(PD)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/11   Time: 15:54   
Sample (adjusted): 1998Q2 2009Q4  
Included observations: 47 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
PD(-1) -0.535290 0.132314 -4.045612 0.0002 
C 266770.7 65579.75 4.067882 0.0002 
@TREND(1998Q1) 4124.840 1084.158 3.804647 0.0004 
R-squared 0.271268     Mean dependent var 6217.043 
Adjusted R-squared 0.238144     S.D. dependent var 42286.37 
S.E. of regression 36909.39     Akaike info criterion 23.93202 
Sum squared resid 5.99E+10     Schwarz criterion 24.05012 
Log likelihood -559.4025     Hannan-Quinn criter. 23.97646 
F-statistic 8.189421     Durbin-Watson stat 2.126634 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000947    
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Table 4.5: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Null Hypothesis: CPI has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.026796  0.5712 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.175640  
 5% level  -3.513075  
 10% level  -3.186854  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(CPI)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/11   Time: 16:02   
Sample (adjusted): 1998Q4 2009Q4  
Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
CPI(-1) -0.136934 0.067562 -2.026796 0.0494 
D(CPI(-1)) 0.321500 0.137313 2.341364 0.0243 
D(CPI(-2)) -0.326346 0.139915 -2.332451 0.0248 
C 10.63809 5.166418 2.059084 0.0460 
@TREND(1998Q1) 0.096033 0.041262 2.327410 0.0251 
R-squared 0.307820     Mean dependent var 0.506667 
Adjusted R-squared 0.238602     S.D. dependent var 1.109955 
S.E. of regression 0.968526     Akaike info criterion 2.878356 
Sum squared resid 37.52167     Schwarz criterion 3.079096 
Log likelihood -59.76300     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.953189 
F-statistic 4.447117     Durbin-Watson stat 2.004718 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004561    
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Table 4.6: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on 14-day Repurchase Rate (RP) 
Null Hypothesis: RP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -9.264046  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.165756  
 5% level  -3.508508  
 10% level  -3.184230  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/11   Time: 16:03   
Sample (adjusted): 1998Q2 2009Q4  
Included observations: 47 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
RP(-1) -0.308556 0.033307 -9.264046 0.0000 
C 0.124625 0.307526 0.405251 0.6873 
@TREND(1998Q1) 0.019553 0.009477 2.063101 0.0450 
R-squared 0.717611     Mean dependent var -0.440781 
Adjusted R-squared 0.704775     S.D. dependent var 1.546375 
S.E. of regression 0.840217     Akaike info criterion 2.551388 
Sum squared resid 31.06243     Schwarz criterion 2.669482 
Log likelihood -56.95762     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.595828 
F-statistic 55.90669     Durbin-Watson stat 1.448715 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 4.7: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on Banks’ Credit (CREDIT) 
Null Hypothesis: CREDIT has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.389950  0.0652 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.170583  
 5% level  -3.510740  
 10% level  -3.185512  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(CREDIT)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/11   Time: 16:04   
Sample (adjusted): 1998Q3 2009Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
CREDIT(-1) -0.299352 0.088306 -3.389950 0.0015 
D(CREDIT(-1)) -0.311800 0.127977 -2.436381 0.0192 
C 2416657. 866146.7 2.790125 0.0079 
@TREND(1998Q1) 63054.46 15598.33 4.042386 0.0002 
R-squared 0.362067     Mean dependent var 78448.87 
Adjusted R-squared 0.316500     S.D. dependent var 974670.9 
S.E. of regression 805800.0     Akaike info criterion 30.12000 
Sum squared resid 2.73E+13     Schwarz criterion 30.27901 
Log likelihood -688.7600     Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.17957 
F-statistic 7.945867     Durbin-Watson stat 2.199217 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000261    
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Table 4.8: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on Banks’ Efficiency (EFFICIENCY) 
Null Hypothesis: EFFICIENCY has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.949673  0.1573 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.170583  
 5% level  -3.510740  
 10% level  -3.185512  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EFFICIENCY)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/11   Time: 16:05   
Sample (adjusted): 1998Q3 2009Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
EFFICIENCY(-1) -0.494690 0.167710 -2.949673 0.0052 
D(EFFICIENCY (-1)) -0.204721 0.142941 -1.432207 0.1595 
C 0.449317 0.151970 2.956612 0.0051 
@TREND(1998Q1) 0.000408 0.000265 1.541783 0.1306 
R-squared 0.350639     Mean dependent var 0.001390 
Adjusted R-squared 0.304256     S.D. dependent var 0.024180 
S.E. of regression 0.020169     Akaike info criterion -4.886415 
Sum squared resid 0.017085     Schwarz criterion -4.727402 
Log likelihood 116.3875     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.826848 
F-statistic 7.559653     Durbin-Watson stat 1.962375 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000374    
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Table 4.9: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on Banks’ Competition (LERNER) 
Null Hypothesis: LERNER has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.493985  0.0041 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.165756  
 5% level  -3.508508  
 10% level  -3.184230  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LERNER)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/26/11   Time: 16:06   
Sample (adjusted): 1998Q2 2009Q4  
Included observations: 47 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
LERNER(-1) -0.632518 0.140748 -4.493985 0.0001 
C 0.177794 0.039475 4.503912 0.0000 
@TREND(1998Q1) 0.000760 0.000187 4.052044 0.0002 
R-squared 0.315170     Mean dependent var 0.001244 
Adjusted R-squared 0.284041     S.D. dependent var 0.009905 
S.E. of regression 0.008381     Akaike info criterion -6.664082 
Sum squared resid 0.003090     Schwarz criterion -6.545987 
Log likelihood 159.6059     Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.619642 
F-statistic 10.12474     Durbin-Watson stat 2.145556 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000241    
 
The ADF tests reveal that the set of variables is a mixture of stationary and 
non-stationary processes. Specifically, 14-day repurchase rate (RP) and banks’ 
competition (LERNER) appears to be stationary at 1% statistical significance, while 
the remaining variables have unit roots or are non-stationary. Hence, OLS estimation 
might result in a spurious regression unless those variables are found to be 
cointegrated. 
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Engel and Granger (1987) pointed out that a linear combination of two or more 
non-stationary time series may be stationary; such linear combination, if any, may be 
interpreted as a long run equilibrium relationship among variables. In other words, a 
principal feature of cointegrated variables is that their time paths might deviate from 
equilibrium in the short run; however, the system of cointegrated variables will 
ultimately return to the long run equilibrium. 
The Johansen test is performed to detect cointegration. I specify the test based 
on the assumption that the level data have linear deterministic trend but the 
cointegrating equation has only intercept (without trend). And, I use one lag in 
differences or two lags in level which are the optimal number of lags suggested by 
Schwarz information criterion above. The test result is shown in table 4.10 below. 
 
Table 4.10: Johansen Cointegration Test 
Sample (adjusted): 1998Q3 2009Q4 
  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments 
 
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend 
 
Series: PD CPI RP CREDIT EFFICIENCY LERNER 
 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1 
 
   
  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.801753 158.0895 95.75366 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.597597 83.65032 69.81889 0.0027 
At most 2 0.354711 41.77648 47.85613 0.1651 
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At most 3 0.213569 21.62589 29.79707 0.3198 
At most 4 0.205182 10.57438 15.49471 0.2391 
At most 5 0.000236 0.010835 3.841466 0.9169 
Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 0.801753 74.43918 40.07757 0.0000 
At most 1 * 0.597597 41.87384 33.87687 0.0045 
At most 2 0.354711 20.15059 27.58434 0.3308 
At most 3 0.213569 11.05151 21.13162 0.6422 
At most 4 0.205182 10.56354 14.26460 0.1775 
At most 5 0.000236 0.010835 3.841466 0.9169 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
The Johansen cointegration test reports that there are two cointegrating 
relationships for both trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics. Generally, if 
cointegration is detected, the short-run relationship of variables should be estimated 
through the Error Correction Model or ECM, in which those variables in levels are 
transformed into first differences. Inevitably, there is a trade-off between loss of 
efficiency when the VAR is estimated in levels and the loss of information about the 
long run relationships when VAR is estimated in first differences. 
  
114
However, most of the empirical literature on VAR concentrates on estimating 
VAR in levels for two reasons; first, the primary concern of most economic theories is 
to provide information about the long run equilibrium; second, according to Disyatat 
and Vongsinsirikul (2003), while estimation in levels might incur some efficiency 
losses, it incurs no cost in term of consistency of estimators, as pointed out by Sims et 
al. (1990) who have shown that even if some variables in VAR model have unit roots, 
the estimates of VAR are consistent. As a result, I estimate VAR in levels. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
 
My VAR model is based on the typically named “bank lending channel”. 
Monetary policies operate through the fall or rise in bank reserves. For example, a 
contractionary monetary policy makes supply of loanable funds fall short, implying 
fewer bank credits can be used to finance consumption and investment. The lending 
channel presumes that bank loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes; consumers and 
firms live in frictional financial markets where issuing securities is very costly. The 
influence of monetary policy thus depends on the degree to which the central bank can 
affect the supply of bank loans and the reliance of borrowers on bank loans. 
Apparently, these two factors are influenced by the structure of the financial market 
such as efficiency and competition. 
So far, I have specified my unrestricted VAR model in levels with 2 lags, 
which includes private demand (PD), consumer price index (CPI), 14-day repurchase 
rate (RP), banks’ loan (CREDIT), banks’ efficiency (EFFICIENCY), and banks’ 
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competition (LERNER). The quarterly data cover the period of 1998Q1 to 2009Q4. In 
this section, I begin with VAR estimates presented in table 4.11 below and then turn to 
the impulse response function analysis illustrating the implied dynamic paths of the 
variables following a one-time shock in the measure of monetary policy. Ultimately, I 
gauge the effect of banks’ efficiency and competition by comparing two sets of 
impulse response: one with banks’ efficiency and competition treated as endogenous 
and another in which they are treated as exogenous. The two procedures generate 
identical VAR results, except that the latter block off any responses within VAR 
which pass through the variables of interest. Thus, comparing the output response of 
the two models gives a measure of the importance of banks’ efficiency and 
competition in facilitating the monetary policy to the real economy. 
 
Table 4.11: The VAR Estimates 
 PD CPI RP LOAN EFF COM 
PD(-1) 0.360491 5.65E-06 3.03E-06 -1.330327 -7.83E-08 3.26E-08
(S.E.) (0.17107) (4.6E-06) (2.3E-06) (3.17753) (7.5E-08) (3.8E-08)
[t-statistics] [ 2.10729] [ 1.22881] [ 1.34766] [-0.41867] [-1.04223] [ 0.85530]
       
PD(-2) 0.311329 5.64E-06 4.25E-07 -2.815154 1.09E-09 1.15E-08
(S.E.) (0.17214) (4.6E-06) (2.3E-06) (3.19740) (7.6E-08) (3.8E-08)
[t-statistics] [ 1.80860] [ 1.21907] [ 0.18755] [-0.88045] [ 0.01443] [ 0.30058]
       
CPI(-1) 11243.48 1.016294 0.256755 135805.9 0.001381 -0.000744
(S.E.) (5989.42) (0.16087) (0.07884) (111251.) (0.00263) (0.00133)
[t-statistics] [ 1.87722] [ 6.31762] [ 3.25658] [ 1.22072] [ 0.52514] [-0.55771]
       
CPI(-2) -6897.049 -0.287789 -0.162512 18038.28 0.001827 0.000976
(S.E.) (5647.35) (0.15168) (0.07434) (104897.) (0.00248) (0.00126)
[t-statistics] [-1.22129] [-1.89736] [-2.18609] [ 0.17196] [ 0.73671] [ 0.77531]
       
RP(-1) 7782.457 -0.032294 0.735271 544252.3 0.003480 -0.003748
(S.E.) (10641.8) (0.28582) (0.14008) (197667.) (0.00467) (0.00237)
[t-statistics] [ 0.73131] [-0.11299] [ 5.24878] [ 2.75338] [ 0.74472] [-1.58037]
       
RP(-2) -8888.205 0.046554 -0.141849 -420769.0 -0.006626 0.003227
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(S.E.) (8378.37) (0.22503) (0.11029) (155625.) (0.00368) (0.00187)
[t-statistics] [-1.06085] [ 0.20688] [-1.28615] [-2.70374] [-1.80085] [ 1.72850]
       
CREDIT(-1) -0.009168 -9.19E-08 -2.56E-07 0.131896 -3.83E-09 -1.98E-09
(S.E.) (0.00892) (2.4E-07) (1.2E-07) (0.16574) (3.9E-09) (2.0E-09)
[t-statistics] [-1.02750] [-0.38353] [-2.17888] [ 0.79581] [-0.97659] [-0.99346]
       
CREDIT(-2) 0.003667 4.58E-07 3.88E-08 0.421775 2.06E-09 1.51E-09
(S.E.) (0.00891) (2.4E-07) (1.2E-07) (0.16548) (3.9E-09) (2.0E-09)
[t-statistics] [ 0.41166] [ 1.91432] [ 0.33085] [ 2.54876] [ 0.52550] [ 0.76119]
       
EFFICIENCY(-1) -244630.7 22.18051 -1.212783 -8239794. -0.028406 0.183305
(S.E.) (436508.) (11.7239) (5.74599) (8107950) (0.19169) (0.09727)
[t-statistics] [-0.56043] [ 1.89190] [-0.21107] [-1.01626] [-0.14819] [ 1.88441]
       
EFFICIENCY(-2) -335840.1 -9.957624 -2.159449 -15959231 0.129657 -0.006031
(S.E.) (340705.) (9.15080) (4.48488) (6328443) (0.14962) (0.07593)
[t-statistics] [-0.98572] [-1.08817] [-0.48150] [-2.52183] [ 0.86661] [-0.07943]
       
LERNER(-1) -219738.0 30.11397 -20.11210 20877100 -0.009111 0.347904
(S.E.) (834525.) (22.4140) (10.9853) (1.6E+07) (0.36647) (0.18597)
[t-statistics] [-0.26331] [ 1.34353] [-1.83082] [ 1.34683] [-0.02486] [ 1.87074]
       
LERNER(-2) 660097.4 -9.967260 -7.017477 8724348. -0.538530 0.309706
(S.E.) (781301.) (20.9845) (10.2847) (1.5E+07) (0.34310) (0.17411)
[t-statistics] [ 0.84487] [-0.47498] [-0.68232] [ 0.60117] [-1.56962] [ 1.77879]
       
C 310913.1 -4.759218 4.175372 7735895. 0.797298 -0.100853
(S.E.) (417108.) (11.2029) (5.49062) (7747603) (0.18317) (0.09295)
[t-statistics] [ 0.74540] [-0.42482] [ 0.76046] [ 0.99849] [ 4.35286] [-1.08501]
 R-squared 0.909388 0.988535 0.931089 0.938718 0.637427 0.832594
 Adj. R-squared 0.876438 0.984365 0.906031 0.916434 0.505582 0.771719
 Sum sq. resids 4.98E+10 35.89462 8.622092 1.72E+13 0.009595 0.002471
 S.E. equation 38830.86 1.042936 0.511151 721266.4 0.017052 0.008653
 F-statistic 27.59907 237.1007 37.15660 42.12484 4.834673 13.67709
 Log likelihood -543.7127 -59.56593 -26.76196 -678.1152 129.6564 160.8590
 Akaike AIC 24.20490 3.155041 1.728781 30.04849 -5.072019 -6.428654
 Schwarz SC 24.72169 3.671831 2.245571 30.56528 -4.555229 -5.911864
 Mean dependent 681996.2 91.74348 2.590673 12983985 0.927189 0.309884
 S.D. dependent 110467.4 8.340894 1.667463 2495063. 0.024251 0.018111
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.83E+12    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.49E+11    
 Log likelihood -995.1525    
 Akaike information criterion  46.65881    
 Schwarz criterion  49.75955    
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Because VAR models are regarded as approximation of the reduced form of 
the structural models, VAR estimates have little or no economic behavioral 
interpretation; instead the VAR models’ proposes focus on forecasting and assessing 
the impacts of shocks.  
To assess the monetary policy transmission mechanism, there are two common 
methods of identifying a VAR: the recursive identification and the structural 
identification. The recursive or Cholesky method is in favor with most recent VAR 
literature on monetary policy mechanism for two reasons. First, Christiano et al. 
(1999) completed a survey of monetary VAR literature and found that the different 
identification schemes produced substantial agreement about the qualitative effects of 
monetary policy. Second, the structural identification requires a good-understanding of 
monetary policy interdependencies in the economy, resulting in a more complicated 
but unnecessarily less controversial model. Hence, my analysis focuses on Cholesky 
decomposition. 
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
 
In order to identify the dynamic response of any endogenous variables to the 
monetary-policy shock using Cholesky decomposition, I identify the ordering of 
variables, according to the speed with which each variable responses to shocks, as 
follows: private demand (PD), consumer price index (CPI), 14-day repurchase rate 
(RP), banks’ loan (CREDIT), banks’ efficiency (EFFICIENCY), and banks’ 
competition (LERNER). The ordering is implied by the assumption on the dynamic 
  
118
structure of the economy. According to my assumption, private demand is the least 
responsive variable, followed by the consumer price index because it is generally 
believed that changes in output and price level require extensive periods of time. The 
14-day repurchase rate is ranked third because the Bank of Thailand sets the policy 
interest rate according to indication about contemporaneous development in output 
and prices. Next to the policy rate is an amount of banks’ total credit, which is 
assumed to reflect contemporaneous shocks to private demand, prices, and monetary 
policy. Then, the last two variables are banks’ efficiency and competition, implying 
that these variables react without delay to all shocks in the system, but disturbances to 
them have no contemporaneous effect on the other variables. Hence, the reduced-form 
errors and the structural disturbance are given by: 
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To assess the monetary transmission mechanism taking into account the effect 
of banks’ efficiency and competition, I use the impulse responses of a one standard 
deviation of monetary policy shock (an exogenous, unexpected, temporary rise in the 
repurchase rate) on private demand, prices, the repurchase rate, banks’ credit, 
efficiency, and competition. Then, I estimate another set of impulse responses 
identical to the benchmark model except that the effects of bank’s efficiency and 
competition are blocked off as they are assumed to be exogenous. 
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Figure 4.2 below presents impulse response functions of the impact of the 
repurchase rate. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy – corresponding to a 
0.45% basis-point rise in the 14-day repurchase rate –causes private demand and 
inflation to decline. Private demand bottoms out after three quarters and trends return 
to pre-shock level. The effect on inflation is more persistent as inflation continues to 
be lower than its pre-shock value without significant sign of recovery. Note that, 
however, for the third to the fifth period, the price level is higher than its pre-shock 
level. This contradictory result is commonly found in the empirical VAR literature on 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism in USA and is dubbed the “price 
puzzle30”.  The 14-day repurchase rate initially increases by 0.45%, continually 
declining and taking around 7 quarters to dissipate. This adjustment reflects the 
reaction of monetary authority to the one time shock in the economy. Banks’ loans are 
also affected by an increase in the monetary-policy rate. Even though banks’ loans 
initially increase, they begin to decline at the third quarter. The effect of tightening 
monetary-policy shock on banks’ loan seems persistent as they decline and do not turn 
back to the pre-shock level after 20 quarters. Banks appear to operate more efficiently 
under the tightening monetary policy regime. Average cost efficiency increases in 
response to the monetary policy shock. However, the efficiency index continuously 
declines and dies out in 9 quarters. Similarly, the competition degree in the banking 
industry is intensified by the monetary policy shock. However, the Lerner index trends 
                                                 
30 Sims (1992) pointed out that the price puzzle could result from the failure to include a rich enough 
specification of the information available to the policy makers. If the policy makers can observe 
variables containing useful information about future inflation, but those variables are ignored in the 
model, then positive innovation in the policy rate may be result in the higher price because they partly 
reflect systematic policy responses to information indicating that inflation is on the way. 
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to increase and return to its normal level. Summarily, an one-time unexpected shock in 
the policy rate gives rise to a temporary fall in private demand; however, the effect on 
price level and banks’ lending appear to be permanent; the results on banks’ efficiency 
and competition seem to be temporary as expected because both efficiency and 
competition are regarded as structural variables and should be driven by only the real 
forces in the long run. 
 
Figure 4.2: Impulse Responses to a Shock in Repurchase Rate in the Baseline Model 
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To examine the role of banks’ efficiency and competition in the transmission 
mechanism, I exogenize the efficiency and competition indices. The VAR thus 
composes of private demand, consumer price index, 14-day repurchase rate, and bank 
loans. Figure 4.3 shows the impulse responses of those variables to an innovation in 
the 14-day repurchase rate. First of all, the response of private demand to the monetary 
policy shock has quite similar shape but is now smaller than in the baseline model and 
the effects dissipate faster. Second, the shape of the impulse response of consumer 
price index is similar to the baseline model, but the effects are smaller. Third, the 14-
day repurchase rate dissipates more quickly i.e. it takes only six quarters to bottom 
out, which are less than 7 quarters of the baseline model. Lastly, bank-loan responses 
are now notably less than in the baseline model. Thus, by comparing the two sets of 
impulse response, I can conclude that ignoring the role of banks’ efficiency and 
competition lessens the influence of monetary policy on output, price and bank credit. 
In other words, the impacts of monetary policy through the lending channel can be 
amplified by the adjustment in banks’ efficiency and competition in the short run. 
Specifically, an unexpected tightening shock of monetary policy means higher 
financial costs to the banking industry, leading them to operate more efficiently and 
compete more fiercely to survive. This helps lubricate the transmission mechanism 
and enlarge the impacts of monetary policy. 
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses to a Shock in Repurchase Rate When Efficiency and 
Competition Are Exogenized. 
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Figure 4.4: Impulse Responses of VEC Model to a Shock in Repurchase Rate 
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However, it has no impact on real variables including efficiency and competition in 
banking sector in the long run. 
In the Cholesky decomposition method, specification of variable ordering is 
important. I alternate the order of variables to see what happens to VAR impulse 
responses. Variables like bank efficiency and competition might be argued could not 
adjust in the short run. I alter their position from the last two to the first two i.e. lying 
before private demand; so that the order becomes efficiency, competition, private 
demand, consumer price index, 14-day repurchase rate, and bank credit. The new 
impulse response of each variable to the monetary shock is given in Figure 4.5 below. 
The reordered Cholesky decomposition gives similar results as the baseline 
model. The unexpected tightening of monetary policy shock affects efficiency and 
competition very little in the very first quarters and the impacts ultimately disappear in 
the long run. Private demand fluctuates only slightly and trends to return to zero after 
8 quarters. However, the responses of price look peculiar; the price level remains 
positive even after 20 quarters. The “price puzzle” mentioned in section 4.4 is a 
possible explanation. A similar result is also found for the 14-day repurchase rate even 
though it takes about 12 quarters to dissipate, which are slightly longer than the 
baseline model. The shape of response of bank credit is quite different. The tightening 
monetary policy shock has positive impact on bank credit in contrast to negative in the 
baseline model. However, summarily, reordered Cholesky decomposition does not 
significantly change the impulse responses. 
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Figure 4.5: Impulse Responses to Monetary Shock When Cholesky Decomposition 
Reordered 
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should be as much interest in the dispersion of efficiency in the industry in addition to 
average efficiency.   If the most efficient bank’s performance drops, whereas all other 
banks’ performance remain the same, allowing cost efficiency scores of all banks  and 
the average cost efficiency of the banking industry to increase, the banking industry 
may not be considered more efficient. Hence, I tried an alternative efficiency index for 
the banking industry. An appealing choice is the standard deviation of cost efficiency 
(STD) which provides information about the dispersion in cost efficiency across the 
banks. A lower standard deviation of cost efficiency indicates that inefficient banks 
decrease their deviation from the most efficient bank, implying an improvement in the 
industry-wide cost efficiency. The new impulse responses when STD is used in place 
of the average efficiency are shown in figure 4.6 below. 
From figure 4.6, the response of STD is different from the baseline as 
illustrated in figure 4.2. The STD reacts negatively to the tightening monetary policy 
shock; this means that on average the gaps between the most efficient bank and those 
who are less efficient become closer. However, the responses of other variables look 
similar with those of the baseline; private demand, price and bank loan decline; the 
competition degree improves firstly but trend to turn back to the normal level in the 
long run. Hence, switching the cost-efficiency index from the average to standard 
deviation does not change the direction of responses of each variable. 
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Figure 4.6: Impulse Responses when the Standard Deviation is Used in Place of 
Average efficiency  
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
Presently, the Bank of Thailand adopts the inflation-targeting scheme of 
monetary policy which firmly focuses on curbing inflation and stabilizing the 
economy. The objective of this chapter is to uncover the impact of this monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in Thailand on key macroeconomic variables taking 
into account the roles of banks’ efficiency and competition in this transmission 
process. In doing so, I employ Vector Auto Regressive model (VAR) and the impulse-
response analysis to show how the economy reacts to an unexpected tightening 
monetary policy. 
The effect of monetary policy on the economy is estimated by the baseline VAR 
model consisting of 6 variables, which are private demand, consumer price index, 14-
day repurchase rate, bank loan, bank efficiency, and bank competition. From the 
impulse responses to a tightening monetary policy shock, I can extract the following 
results: 
1. Private demand follows a U-shaped response. It reacts negatively, bottoming 
out after 3-4 quarters, then showing a recovery trends. 
2. The consumer price index responses only a little in the very first quarters, but 
begin to decrease permanently after five quarters. 
3. Both bank efficiency and competition are temporarily enhanced. Nonetheless, 
they are not affected by the monetary policy shock in the long run. 
The responses of output and price level to monetary policy shock are consistent 
with previous studies in both Thailand and other developed countries like the EU, 
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USA, and Japan. These finding confirm the neutrality of money in the long run. My 
finding about the impact of tightening monetary policy on bank efficiency and 
competition shows that these are temporarily improved, but both efficiency and 
competition are structural variables driven by the real forces of the economy such as 
input supply, innovation and productivity growth as predicted by modern economic 
theories. 
 Second, I unearth the roles of bank efficiency and competition in the 
transmission mechanism by estimating the VAR model again except that bank 
efficiency and competition are modeled as exogenous variables. The impulse 
responses reveal that the impacts of tightening monetary on output and price level are 
less powerful in the short run and dissipate faster because banks are not allowed to 
improve their cost efficiency and competition in response to the tightening-monetary 
policy shock as otherwise they should be in the baseline case, implying that an 
improvement in bank efficiency and competition helps strengthen the impacts of 
monetary policy. 
Hence, my findings suggest that, in order to strengthen the monetary 
transmission mechanism in the near future, bank of Thailand should somehow enhance 
efficiency and competition in banking sector for example by liberalizing and 
developing the financial market. 
The VAR model used in this study, although including bank efficiency and 
competition as proxies of bank operation, may not completely represent bank 
management. For example, some measures of excess fund available in the banking 
industry such as the loan-to-deposit ratio or government bonds-to-loan ratio might be 
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included in the VAR model because the power of monetary policy in the bank-lending 
channel crucially depends on banks’ available funding and banks’ decision on 
allocating funding between government securities regarded as safe investments and 
loans regarded as risky assets. This might help improve insights into the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism but is left for the future research. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Data Set 
Y/Q 
GDP - 
Government 
Expenditure 
(million 
baht) 
CPI 14-day repurchase 
Bank 
credit 
(million 
baht) 
Average 
cost 
efficiency 
Lerner 
index 
1998Q1 660,815 80.4 21.97 14,078,740 0.94 0.28 
1998Q2 605,679 82.2 17.72 13,658,195 0.89 0.28 
1998Q3 578,721 82.9 10.66 13,281,355 0.87 0.28 
1998Q4 641,507 82.5 4.82 8,527,465 0.84 0.30 
1999Q1 658,425 82.5 3.34 12,400,674 0.91 0.29 
1999Q2 619,031 81.9 1.84 12,198,351 0.89 0.29 
1999Q3 639,223 82.1 1.61 11,859,443 0.91 0.29 
1999Q4 684,272 82.6 1.53 11,584,150 0.94 0.29 
2000Q1 699,715 83.2 1.53 11,256,501 0.94 0.28 
2000Q2 662,813 83.2 1.57 11,113,525 0.93 0.30 
2000Q3 651,940 83.8 1.50 10,675,403 0.95 0.29 
2000Q4 716,801 83.9 1.50 9,963,834 0.91 0.29 
2001Q1 710,954 84.4 1.50 9,902,127 0.95 0.29 
2001Q2 672,766 85.3 1.75 9,826,660 0.95 0.30 
2001Q3 664,392 85.2 2.50 9,508,860 0.96 0.30 
2001Q4 741,463 84.8 2.49 9,327,261 0.91 0.33 
2002Q1 739,363 84.9 1.85 10,345,264 0.94 0.30 
2002Q2 711,705 85.5 1.82 10,936,736 0.93 0.30 
2002Q3 708,992 85.5 1.73 10,881,012 0.95 0.30 
2002Q4 790,923 86.0 1.63 11,077,510 0.92 0.30 
2003Q1 801,338 86.5 1.74 11,267,163 0.93 0.30 
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Y/Q 
GDP - 
Government 
Expenditure 
(million 
baht) 
CPI 14-day repurchase 
Bank 
credit 
(million 
baht) 
Average 
cost 
efficiency 
Lerner 
index 
2003Q2 759,739 86.9 1.73 11,427,580 0.92 0.31 
2003Q4 856,629 87.4 1.25 11,699,058 0.90 0.32 
2004Q1 854,199 88.2 1.25 11,909,648 0.91 0.32 
2004Q2 809,950 89.2 1.25 12,230,787 0.91 0.32 
2004Q3 808,961 90.0 1.35 12,419,874 0.92 0.31 
2004Q4 905,196 90.1 1.75 12,824,573 0.92 0.32 
2005Q1 879,571 90.7 2.08 12,850,687 0.92 0.32 
2005Q2 845,083 92.6 2.32 13,039,503 0.91 0.32 
2005Q3 842,278 95.0 2.86 13,269,483 0.90 0.31 
2005Q4 946,165 95.5 3.72 13,818,620 0.95 0.31 
2006Q1 935,422 95.9 4.28 14,114,065 0.94 0.30 
2006Q2 889,086 98.1 4.80 14,470,420 0.94 0.31 
2006Q3 885,790 98.5 5.00 14,522,112 0.94 0.31 
2006Q4 993,738 98.6 3.33 14,802,285 0.92 0.31 
2007Q1 974,510 98.2 4.72 14,775,043 0.94 0.31 
2007Q2 925,251 100.0 3.81 15,017,354 0.93 0.32 
2007Q3 927,872 100.1 3.30 15,058,213 0.94 0.32 
2007Q4 1,042,034 101.5 3.25 15,461,276 0.93 0.33 
2008Q1 1,041,874 103.2 3.25 15,968,106 0.96 0.33 
2008Q2 980,033 107.5 3.25 16,636,650 0.95 0.34 
2008Q3 956,491 107.4 3.58 17,194,613 0.95 0.33 
2008Q4 983,684 103.7 3.47 17,519,387 0.92 0.34 
2009Q1 955,877 102.9 1.65 17,353,108 0.96 0.34 
2009Q2 920,294 104.5 1.26 17,206,586 0.95 0.34 
2009Q3 917,004 105.0 1.25 16,991,662 0.93 0.34 
2009Q4 1,039,803 105.7 1.25 17,266,843 0.95 0.34 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Summary 
 This dissertation studies microeconomic and macroeconomic issues in banking 
sector. I first study individual-bank efficiency, then the competition in banking 
industry, and finally the roles of efficiency and competition of banking sector in 
monetary policy transmission. A set of questions are posed in the first chapter and this 
chapter will summarize the answers. 
 In chapter 2, the major questions were “Which banks are efficient and why are 
some banks less efficient?” To answer those questions, I estimate a stochastic cost 
frontier and measure individual cost inefficiency. Both commercial banks and 
government-owned specialized banks are included in this study, although in this 
chapter I focus on commercial banks’ results because their performance  are relevant 
to the analysis in the following two chapters. The evidence indicates that Krung Thai 
Bank is the most efficient bank, followed by Siam Commercial Bank, Bangkok Bank, 
and Kasikorn Bank, respectively. These are the biggest four banks who have 
dominated the banking sector of Thailand for decades. On the other hand, the smallest 
four banks that are new entries to the industry are ranked at the bottom in efficiency. 
In addition, the evidence indicates that banks with lower Non-performing-loans-to-
total-loan ratios, higher equity-to-total-asset ratios, higher liquid-asset-to-total-asset 
ratios, and more branches are likely to be more efficient. 
 In chapter 3, I use the new empirical industrial organization approach to 
answer the following questions: “What is the extent of collusive behavior in the 
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banking sector?” and “Did competition in banking sector increase as a result of 
financial deregulation after the financial meltdown in 1997?” The estimated conduct 
parameter indicates that the degree of banks collusion is substantially low, that is, a 
decline in a bank’s loan quantity will be mostly offset by an increase in loan supply of 
rivals. However, surprisingly, the empirical results suggest that the degree of 
competition in the banking sector as measured by the Lerner index, continually 
deteriorated after the financial crisis in 1997 and the subsequent deregulation of the 
industry. In fact, the concentration ratio of the biggest four banks (CR4) has steadily 
increased after the crisis, resulting in an increase in the Lerner index, or a decline in 
the competition environment,  mainly because the benefit of cost-efficiency resulting 
from the increased concentration does not offset the unfavorable effect of higher 
market-power associated with the higher concentration. These econometric findings 
might suggest the relative failure of the Thai government’s attempts to enhance 
competition in the banking industry. 
 In chapter 4, the question is “How do bank efficiency and competition affect 
monetary policy transmission? To answer this question, I employ the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model to study the transmission of monetary policy, taking into 
account the role of bank efficiency and competition. To accomplish this,, I incorporate 
the bank efficiency index and bank competition index computed in chapter 2 and 
chapter 3, respectively, into my VAR model. The impulse response functions indicate 
the neutrality of money, that is, the real variables such as output, efficiency and 
competition are not affected by the monetary policy in the long run; however, 
monetary policy is still a reliable tool to alleviate inflation in the long run. To answer 
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the major question of chapter 4, I gauge the importance of banks’ efficiency and 
competition by comparing two set of impulse response functions, which are identical 
except that the bank efficiency and competition variables are treated either as 
endogenous or exogenous variables.  The impulse responses reveal that the impact of  
tightening monetary policy on output and price level are less powerful in the short run 
and dissipate faster when bank efficiency and competition are blocked off or treated as 
exogenous variables. Hence, these empirical results might imply that bank efficiency 
and competition have important roles in helping strengthen the transmission of 
monetary policy. 
 Summarily, bank efficiency and competition are not only unanimously 
regarded as preferable forces to foster long run economics growth, but also it is shown 
in chapter 4 that they play important roles in helping strengthen the impact of 
monetary policy. Hence, the policy implication is that Thai government should exert 
more effort to enhance efficiency and competition in the banking sector. To improve 
efficiency, the results of chapter 2 suggest that the government introduce policies to 
stabilize the banking system, such as encouraging banks to reduce their non-
performing loans and increase their equity. The results of chapter 3 suggest the 
government should intensify financial liberalization and deregulation to encourage 
more new entries into the industry, which should help decrease market concentration 
and enhance competition in the banking sector. 
 
